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Abstract
This paper analyses the connection between legal origins and generalized trust.
Based on recent results of institutions and trust research it argues that legal ori-
gins and trust are connected via the beliefs of agents. Next, it develops hypotheses
about a complex and self-reinforcing causal relation between both. It then shows
empirically that indeed, legal origins and contemporary trust are robustly connected
with each other. In a next step, it investigates the deep historical roots of trust to
construct proxies for historical trust levels in 1500 AD. By making use of the histor-
ical trust scores and information about the exogenous or endogenous introduction
of legal origins in certain countries it assess some of the claims about causality made
before. Here, it found confirming evidence for the propositions of Aghion et al.
(2010), namely that (i) countries for which legal origins are endogenous did develop
other legal traditions depending on their ex-ante (historical) trust values and (ii)
that the effects of an exogenous introduction of legal origins vary depending on
ex-ante trust levels.
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1. Introduction
“What concerns me is not the way things are, but rather the way people think things
are.” What was already know by the ancient Grecian philosopher Epictetus, is quite new
to economists: That it matters for economic outcomes what people believe, think and
expect. It is only in the last two decades, that this insight has led to the emergence of
many fruitful areas of research like cultural economics. These new research areas among
other things have brought trust, —i.e. the beliefs of people about the trustworthiness
and honesty of others— in the focus of economic research efforts.1
However, until now economic research was concentrated on the importance of trust
for growth and economic development.2 Starting with Helliwell (1996) and Knack and
Keefer (1997) a series of influential empirical papers (e.g. La Porta et al. 1997; Whiteley
2000; Zack and Knack 2001; Dearmon and Grier 2009; Roth, 2009; Algan and Cahuc
2010; Dincer and Uslaner 2010 and O¨zcan and Bjørnskov 2011) found clear evidence that
trust has a significant positive influence on various measures of economic performance.
Only Roth (2009) comes to the conclusion that an increase in trust is —at least in
developed countries with already high trust levels— negatively associated with growth.
However, still the most of these studies fail to establish a clear channel through which
trust transmits to economic growth. The same holds true for the question of the causal
relationship between trust and formal institutions. Studies dealt with this issue produced
pretty much inconsistent findings. 3
Nevertheless, some studies coming from a more theoretical perspective highlight the
close relationship between culture, trust, social norms and formal institutions (e.g.
Aghion et al. 2010, Guiso et al. 2008a or Tabellini 2008b). For instance, the study
of Aghion et al. (2010) suggests that high trust leads to lower regulation and less
corruption and therefore to better development. Their findings also imply a complex
co-evolution between trust and legal institutions that eventually could explain the con-
tradicting findings of the previous literature. As such, the results of these papers are
the starting point for our considerations.
The aim of this paper is to assess both possible channels through which trust (i.e.
1This definition of trust goes back to Luhmann (2000). In more economic terms, Knack and Keefer
(1997) describe trust as the expectations of agents about the percentage of people who will cooperate
in a one-shot prisoners dilemma. The idea of trust and its measurement will be discussed in more
detail in section three of the paper.
2The seminal works of Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1993) can be seen as starting point for this strand
of research.
3Papers dealing with this issue and coming to different results are e.g. Ahlerup et al. (2009), Bergh and
Bjørnskov (2011), Bjørnskov (2009a), In Bjørnskov (2010), Bjørnskov and Me´on (2010), Heinemann
and Tanz (2008) , Labonne and Chase (2010) and Zak and Knack (2001).
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informal institutions) and formal institutions (measured through legal origins) could be
connected and the causality between them. To do so, it uses the results of existing
empirical and experimental trust research to develop hypotheses about the complex
causality between institutions and trust. Following the reasoning of Aghion et al. (201)
a complex co-evolution between institutional environment and trust, where beliefs (trust)
form legal institutions and legal institutions form beliefs (trust) is postulated.
In the empirical part we will use the different legal traditions and various institutional
and regulatory environments typically connected with them as aggregated measure of
the institutional environment to test the theoretical propositions. Hence, this study
connects the economic literature on legal origins (e.g. Botero et al. 2004; Glaeser and
Shleifer 2002; La Porta et al. 2004 and La Porta et al. 2008) with trust research.
Furthermore, this research is the first attempt to provide a closer analysis of the
connection between the different legal systems and the level of trust in a society. Fur-
thermore, it shows that the emergence of different legal traditions and their spread
around the world through conquest, colonization or voluntarily adoption can be used
to examine which of the various hypotheses about the causal relationship between trust
and institutions is correct.
For this purpose, proxies for the historical trust level in 1500 AD are constructed.
These should enable us to investigate whether societies choose other legal systems con-
ditional on their ex-ante level of generalized trust (exogeneity of trust). Secondly, they
can help us to identify a possible causal impact of the exogenous introduction of differ-
ent legal traditions (through colonization) on trust (endogeneity of trust)via a Difference
in Difference (DiD) approach. Hence,the paper also offers a first empirical test of the
propositions of Aghion et al. (2010) and related models. The empirical estimations
found confirming evidence for all hypothesis. They show that there is a robust relation
between trust and legal origins, that societies with different level of trust develop dif-
ferent institutions and that the effect of exogenous introduction of legal origins through
colonization has different effects conditional on high or low ex-ante trust.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: First of all, we discuss theoretical
arguments and derive hypotheses about the connection and causal relationship between
trust and institutions.In the next step, the data and the contemporary and historical
trust measures used in the remainder of the paper are introduced and discussed. After
that, we at first show empirically that there is a robust relation between trust and legal
origins. Then we elaborately assess the causality question. Finally, in section five we
conclude.
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2. Theory and Hypotheses
2.1. The Connection between Trust and Legal Origins
In their survey of the legal origin literature La Porta et al. (2008, p. 286) define legal
origins as “a style of social control of economic life...”. And concerning the two main legal
traditions, common and civil law they state “...common law stands for the strategy of
social control that seeks to support private market outcomes, whereas civil law seeks to
replace such outcomes with state-desired allocations.” (La Porta et al., p. 286). In their
view the different legal origins reflect different perceptions about law and its function.
They represent some general ideas that were realized in specific rules, institutions and
beliefs of the agents acting in the respective legal environment (La Porta et al. 2008,
p. 286). Another widely cited definition stems from Zweigert and Ko¨tz (1998, p.72).
They define legal traditions as “...a religious or political conception how economic life or
social life should be organized.”. An alternative way to differentiate between the legal
traditions is developed by Djankov et al. (2003). They highlight that a legal system
usually has to deal with two different kinds of problems. On the one hand the problem
of disorder and market failure and on the other hand the problem of dictatorship and
abuse. They also reckon that there is probably a trade-off between both.
As mentioned, the literature regularly identifies two main legal traditions. The com-
mon law tradition, developed in England after the Glorious Revolution and rooted in
the Magna Carta from the early 13th century and Civil law tradition finally developed
after the French Revolution. Civil law is divided into various sub-traditions and hybrid
forms – the French, German and Scandinavian legal tradition (La Porta et al. 2008, p.
288). Klerman et al. (2011, p. 7) additionally identify an Islamic legal tradition rooted
in the shari’ah.
But where is the link between these “styles of social control” or these different ideas
of freedom and the role of law to generalized trust? Expressed differently, where is the
link between informal institutions (like trust, culture and social norms) and the design
of formal institutions? The link can be found we propose in the remark of La Porta
et al. (2008, p. 286) that these general and abstract ideas are integrated not only in
the existing institutional environment but also in the beliefs of people. In other words:
The different legal systems reflect deep-rooted differences in the way people are used
to interact and deal with each other. These differences in turn show up in concrete
and particular legal rules, procedures and institutional arrangements and are imprinted
in the institutional environment, convictions and ideologies that constitute the legal
systems. The hypothesis is that these different ways of dealing with others and these
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different ideas about the organization of social life are to some extend determined by
the level of generalized trust that was present in these societies in the period before they
develop their legal traditions. Because trust describes the self-reinforcing expectations
about others trustworthiness, civicness and honesty it has to be related to the kind of
institutions and rules a society develops or —-to state it economically— it is related to
what kind of institutions and rules are efficient. The logic is exactly the same as in the
model of Aghion et al. (2010). Their, if people expect to live in a honest and trustworthy
society they expect low levels of corruption and regulation. In such a society the last is
simply not necessary and people do not regulate entry. Their beliefs are confirmed and
so their political choices also lead to honesty, trustworthiness and less regulation. This
results in high levels of entrepreneurial activity what in turn raises social welfare. But
when people expect to live in a bad and untrustworthy environment they do not become
trustworthy and reliable people. This is because in such a society there is no incentive
to become trustworthy as the expected pay-offs of becoming a civic entrepreneur are
low since there is e.g. high regulation of entry. This leads to a situation where only the
most productive and the most corrupt individuals can become entrepreneurs. But then
the beliefs are again justified and their political choices lead to even more regulation,
corruption and disorder and to even lower levels of economic activity. Furthermore,
parents will start to educate their children to uncivic and corrupt persons and in the end
a high number of corrupt and not trusting people prevail. So, there are two equilibria one
with high trust and low regulation and one with low trust and high regulation (Aghion
et al. 2010, p. 1016).
However, this story about the relation of trust and legal traditions is compatible with
other models developed in the institutional literature. For example Tabellini (2008a, pp.
909) or that of Guiso et al. (2008a) who develop a model of how priors about the trust-
worthiness of others (generalized trust) are transmitted from generation to generation.
Depending on the initial distribution of trustworthy and untrustworthy people parents
will impart other beliefs about the trustworthiness of others to their children. The chil-
dren will act complementary and furthermore will sustain these beliefs by teaching it
also to their offspring. The society will end up with a low trust level, low cooperation
and investment or with high trust, many investments and a large extent of cooperation.
The interplay between the decisions of parents and the external environment/ values
generates a self-reinforcing process resulting in different and stable equilibria. 4
4Furthermore there are some relations of our argument to the work of Alesina and Angeletos (2005a,
2005b). In Alesina and Angeletos (2005a) it is shown that a bigger government increases corruption
what in turn increases the demand for regulation and therefore again the size of government. In an-
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Moreover, there are some connections to Carlin et al. (2010) who show that trust could
act as a substitute or a complement for government regulation depending on the value of
social capital and to Piketty (1995) who probably was the first in noticing that different
beliefs of people based on different information, experience and economic situations can
influence policy and institutions.
Finally, we can state the following general hypothesis about the relation between trust
and legal origins/ institutions:
Hypothesis 1. There is a significant relationship between institutional features con-
nected with legal origins (regulation, characteristics of the judicial system etc.) and the
level of trust in a society. The relation between different legal traditions and trust is
expected to be different.
2.2. Trust and Institutions – The Causality Issue
The empirical and experimental trust research up till now has undertaken various efforts
to identify the causality between formal institutions and generalized trust. As already
discussed, this literature did not yield clear conclusions until now.
We develop a non-formal model proposing a complex causality – or co-evolution
between trust and institutions during different stages of development. In this model
trust is sometimes endogenous and sometimes exogenous and sometimes there is a co-
evolutionary and self-reinforcing interaction between both. As a consequence this model
can integrate all different findings brought forward in the literature culminating the puz-
zling evidence in a coherent framework. To do so we base our model on the theoretical
and empirical insights of Aghion et al. (2010) and the other models on the interaction
between institutions, beliefs and trust mentioned in the before. We supplement them by
findings of experimental and neuroeconomic trust research.
Sutter and Kocher (2006) and Bellemare and Kro¨ger (2007, p. 200) for example
provide an explanation for the findings of Labonne and Chase (2010). They explain the
inverted U-shaped relation between trust and age which they found in their experiments
with the different number of social interactions people are involved during their lifetime.
Because middle aged people are engaged in more social interactions than young and old
people their trust (or pro-social behaviour in general) is higher.
Secondly, Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2006) and Eckel and Wilson (2004) conclude from
their experiments that trust is different from simple risky decisions for example on finan-
other paper (Alesina and Angeletos 2005b) the authors illustrate that different beliefs about fairness,
inequality and solidarity in a society determine the kind of redistributive policy that is chosen.
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cial markets and that it is a “conditional judgment” based on information or inference
about the trustworthiness of others. In other words: people try to put oneself in some-
one’s position. 5 In other words there is not conventional risk when people have to
trust but some kind of “social risk” or “betrayal risk” that people try to reduce when
evaluating the trustworthiness of their counterparts.
Moreover, the neuroeconomic study of McCabe et al. (2001) show that when people
trust or cooperate in a game then the brain activity differs depending on whether they
play against a human or a computer. Other studies (Fehr et al. 2005; Kosfeld et al. 2005)
come to the result that one could lower betrayal aversion (as a part of the preference
component of trust) in trust games if one infuses people a dose of the neuropeptide
oxytocin.6
Taking all this evidence, all this empirical and theoretical arguments presented here
and discussed in the literature into account one can postulate the following story about
the emergence and evolution of trust and its co-evolution with the institutional contin-
uum:
First, trust maybe develops within a tribe or a small village. This trust maybe enables
or at least fosters the interaction between strangers and therefore increases trade and
exchange for example of knowledge. This again could cause social and economic devel-
opment. So, it seems appropriate to assume that trust was exogenous to institutions
and growth at the beginning. But then trust becomes endogenous for the greater part at
this stage of development: This is because trust may grow with more social interactions
that are promoted by falling interactions costs, evolved social norms or some cultural
features of a society. These again result from the technological and organizational ad-
vantages that only become possible through trust promoted interactions. At this stage
trust probably spreads out and is preserved through some process of gene-culture co-
evolution discussed in Durham (1991) or through some cultural selection processes as
described in Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), Galor and Moav (2002) or Tabellini (2008a).
But then trust reaches at its limit when development advances further. The limit
exists because trust is related to social closeness, similarity between people and homo-
geneity in general. This follows from the findings of experimental and neuroeconomic
5Among the information people use to investigate the trustworthiness of others is for example sex,
attractiveness or mimics (Eckel and Wilson 2004, p. 464). In another study Scharlemann et al.
(2001) found that also smiling seems to be a relevant facial expression that indicates trustworthiness.
6Another even more speculative link is suggested by Zak and Fakhar (2006) who present some first cues
that the trust level in a country could be connected to the intake of oxytocin and to environmental
conditions. They also propose that the consumption of food containing phytoestrogenes may raise
the trust level. This establishes a connection between the diet of people and the trust level in a
country.
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trust research discussed above that link trust to humans and generalized trust (the be-
liefs part of trust) in particular to a conditional judgement of the others trustworthiness.
But social closeness and similarity both decrease when a society becomes more differ-
entiated, anonymous and complex. As a consequence, formal institutions and a legal
system will emerge as abstract and anonymous phenomena partly substituting trust. At
what level/time of development this limit occurs depends on the initial level of trust. In
a society with high trust levels it will appear earlier than in a low trust society. This is
due to the fact that in high trust societies the virtuous circle created through the inter-
play of trust and its outcomes accelerates development. Furthermore, the institutional
environment that is created is likely to be very different dependent on the initial level of
trust. This fits e.g. to the considerations of Aghion et al. (2010,). Consequently, we also
follow them in stating that trust is also endogenous at that stage because it is likely that
the institutional environment interacts with trust through the shaping of incentives and
beliefs. If some exogenous shocks lead to more regulation or stronger formal institutions
trust will maybe decline then. So, at this stage trust is both endogenous and exogenous.
Apart from the fact that it is predetermined by some time-invariant exogenous deter-
minants and therefore relatively stable over time the level of trust can change itself as a
consequence of the implementation of new/ other institutions. This works through the
self-reinforcing interaction between institutions and beliefs. As an outcome of such an
interaction eventually self-sustaining and stable multiple equilibria arise. Such multiple
equilibria again have different implications for the further economic and social develop-
ment of the society.
From this story we can derive some testable hypotheses and estimation strategies to
validate our claims and to investigate the true causality between trust and institutions.
Among others, especially two important hypotheses emerge:7
Hypothesis 2. High trust societies will create another institutional environment than
low trust societies when they arrive at a stage of development where trust is not sufficient
to sustain development. (Trust is exogenous to institutions).8 The logic here is that
high trust societies had lower transactions costs because they had less rigid and less
anonymous institutions and less formal legal systems. That enables cooperation and
7Other implications of the model are for example that trust is a precondition for growth and develop-
ment at a very early stage of development. As a consequence, it should be seen as exogenous in this
case. However, in this paper we will concentrate on other aspects of the model.
8 Countries that exhibit a high level of generalized trust before they decide which complex institutional
environments to develop will choose a legal system characterized through low regulation, formalism
and high individual independence. Countries with low levels of exogenous generalized trust will
choose more formal and rigid regulation and a centralized legal system.
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save costs because they do not need complex and differentiated institutions regulating
everything and are very costly of course. This type of institutions is (partly) replaced by
trust.
Hypothesis 3. Trust is endogenous to formal institutions at a late stage of develop-
ment. A change in formal institutional arrangements maybe decreases or increases trust
—-depending on the initial level of trust— and then again changes the institutional en-
vironment due to the connection of both institutions and trust via beliefs.
Note that hypothesis two and three include the predictions Aghion et al. (2010) made
on the basis of their model. Therefore, in the following they are called “First Aghion
et al. Hypothesis” and . In the cases of common and civil law, “Second Aghion et al.
Hypothesis” would imply that if common law is introduced in a low trust country the
level of generalized trust will decline. If instead civil law is introduced the level of trust
will remain stable but at a lower level than in a high trust country where common law
is introduced. When in a high trust country civil law is implemented the trust level will
decline over time and maybe could even fall under the level of a low trust country with
civil law. At last, if in a high trust country common law is introduced trust will remain
stable at a level above that of a low trust country with civil law.
Having stated that, we now can turn to the description and discussion of the variables
and measures used in the empirical section of the paper.
3. Data and Measurement
In the empirical analysis following this chapter, including both trust measures, overall
46 Variables from 19 different sources are included. All variables are on country level.
Table A.1 in the Appendix provide a descriptive overview over all variables.
3.1. The Contemporary Trust Scores
The countries current trust levels we measure —following every other paper in the em-
pirical trust literature the author is aware— with the share of respondents that answer
the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that
you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” with “Most people can be trusted”
from the World Values Survey (WVS) or related surveys like the Eurobarometer, the
Lationbarometer, the Afrobarometer or the East-Asian Barometer.9. Experimental trust
9 To the knowledge of the author, all these different surveys ask literally the same question. The second
part of the answer differs slightly between the surveys and the different waves of the respective surveys.
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research (e.g. Holm and Danielson 2005) shows that trusting behaviour consists out of
a preference part and a beliefs part. This question should measure the beliefs (expecta-
tions) part of trust. That is it indicates the prevalence of generalized trust in instead of
specific or particularized trust.10 We follow in the previous literature (e.g. Bergh and
Bjørnskov 2011; Bjørnskov, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010 and Bjørnskov and Me´on 2010) and
use the average trust scores over different waves and periods of the respective surveys.11
To be precise we use the trust scores sample of Bjørnskov and Me´on (2010). According
to them these trust scores are collected from the fifth and most recent wave of the WVS,
the 1995 and 2003 Latinobarometer, the 2001 – 2004 East Asian Barometer, the 2001 –
2007 Afro-Barometer and the 2002 – 2004 Danish Social Capital Project. 12
Bjørnskov (2011, p. 13) has mentioned additionally some anomalies in the fourth
wave of the WVS where some trust scores fall or rise sharply compared to the values in
the waves before. To avoid measurement error we therefore constructs an own sample
for robustness checks.13 A comparison between both datasets for the most countries
shows only marginal differences (probably due to rounding or different treatment of “no
answer” responses). But for Thailand (difference 36.46 %), Uruguay (difference 10.81 %)
there are very huge differences. Additionally we found differences between five and 10
10 Some scholars are concerned with the validity of this trust measure (e.g. Guinanne 2005). Much
experimental trust research therefore assessed the validity of the trust survey question by comparing
it with the actual trusting behaviour observed in the laboratory and its different components. The
evidence produced by this literature is pretty much inconclusive.Glaeser et al. (2000), Ga¨chter (2004),
Holm and Danielson (2005), Ashraf et al. (2006), and Karlan (2005) found that the usual trust survey
question does not capture trust but trustworthy behaviour and suggest the use of other questions
e.g. about trust in strangers explicitly. On the other hand, Sapienza et al. (2010,) Cox et al. (2009)
and Capra et al. (2008) report that the trust question is a valid predictor of the beliefs component
of trust and the actual trusting behaviour in an trust experiment.
Furthermore, a point in favor of the standard WVS trust question is its strong correlation with
the share of wallets returned in a so called “lost wallet game” mentioned by Knack and Keefer (1997,
pp. 1257) and Bjørnskov (2011, pp. 8). Because such a “lost wallet game” seems to be a convincing
indicator for what is meant by generalized trust there is some external validity of the question.
11 Since many studies (e.g. Algan and Cahuc 2010; Bjørnskov 2006, 2011; Tabellini 2008b; Guiso et al.
2008b and Uslaner 2008) show that trust is relatively stable over time and has historical roots going
back at least to the 17th century we will use average trust scores over different waves and periods
of the respective surveys. This seems to be suitable also because it corrects some random or minor
fluctuations that did not reflect secular time trends.
12 Of course, because we use their sample we follow them in excluding China and Iran from the sample
because of their quiet unusual and extraordinary high trust scores.
13 These dataset is constructed as follows: It uses all currently available trust data from the Afrobarom-
eter (Waves 1999/2001 and 2005/2006), the Latinobarometer from 1995 to 2010 and the East Asian
Barometer from 2001 – 2003. These data is adopted from the respective online data analysis tools
of the different surveys. For all other countries the trust scores are from the WVS 1981 – 2008 ag-
gregated dataset. Some countries are not included in this data file for those we took the trust values
from the latest wave of WVS (conducted between 2005 – 2008). This information we again receive
via the online data analysis tool on the WVS website. Finally, data not available from those sources
is supplemented by the original Bjørnskov and Me´on (2010) sample.
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% for ten other countries.14 So, maybe these differences will change some of the results.
Overall the sample reports the trust scores for 114 countries. 15 In the next section
we will introduce and discuss our historical trust values we will later use to identify
causality.
3.2. The Deep Roots of Trust – Constructing Historical Trust Proxies
Since survey trust questions are not available for more than the last 40 years or so for the
identification of causality we need to found variables that are robustly related to present
survey trust questions and either time-invariant or available for a time period before the
introduction of legal origins. With these variables we are then able to construct proxies
for historical trust levels in 1500 AD. 16
In a first attempt to uncover the historical roots of trust, Bjørnskov (2011) discovered
historical correlates of social trust ranging back till the middle of the 17th century. This
is already a quite enormous achievement but because our variables should go back at least
to the beginning of colonization at the end of the 15th century this is not enough for our
purpose. Fortunately, the so called cultural school (e.g. Guiso 2008b; Tabellini 2008b)
not only found evidence for a possible long-term persistence of trust since the middle age
but also that is significantly determined by some at least largely time-invariant cultural
variables like language or religion. Such variables can potentially be used to construct
our proxies.
Christian Bjørnskov already used such kinds as instruments for historical trust in
several papers (Bjørnskov 2009a; Bjørnskov 2010a, Bjørnskov and Me´on 2010 and Bergh
and Bjørnskov 2011). These variables are the minimum temperature in the coldest month
of the year in a country, a dummy variable for countries that retain their monarchies
and a dummy variable indicating whether the main language spoken in a country allow
to drop the personal pronoun.
14 These countries are Belarus, Canada (this case is mentioned by Bjørnskov (2011, p. 13) as well),
the Netherlands, El Salvador, Estonia, Japan, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Serbia and
Singapore.
15 The former represents trust in a specific group of people one interacts repeatedly; the latter means
trust in strangers i.e. people one does not know, in general. So, according to Knack and Keefer
(1997, pp. 1257) this kind of trust reflects the expectations of people about the percentage of other
people that will cooperate in a one-shot prisoners dilemma. Such kind of trust can therefore be seen
as substitute for formal institutions.
16 We are going to regress the variables we identify as proxy variables for the trust levels in 1500 AD
on the contemporary trust levels and then predict the fitted values. These fitted values we then use
as “proxies” for trust in 1500 AD in our regressions. This corresponds not exactly to the statistical
definition of a proxy variable. However, because it seems nevertheless the best and most adequate
term, in the following we will call these fitted values “proxy”.
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The latter variable was originally constructed by the psychologists Kashima and
Kashima (1998) who used it to link language characteristics to cultural characteris-
tics of the countries in which they are spoken. They found that languages that do not
allow to drop the personal pronouns (like for example the Nordic languages or English)
are connected with higher individualism than languages that do allow the pronoun drop
(like Spanish). For the first time this variable was used in trust research by Tabellini
(2008b).17 He remarked that the literature uses this variable to instrument cultures with
respect for individual rights i.e. that value the individual relatively more than its social
relations. Furthermore the non-possibility of pronoun drop seems to be connected with
societies that have better law enforcement and show a higher respect for the rules and
laws. This all leads to the conclusion that this time-invariant grammatical rule has to
be connected with generalized trust.
However, with respect to our subject of analysis —-the introduction of legal traditions
around the world— it is not without problems. This is because the legal origins of
many countries are connected with colonization. Colonization in turn is also connected
with the introduction of the language of the colonizer in the colonized country. So,
for colonies the pronoun drop variable maybe cannot be treated as time-invariant and
exogenous to the introduction of legal origins. If the European languages that were
brought to the colonies change the way people in the colonies think about the world and
the relation between individual and society the use of the pronoun variable is maybe not
meaningful.18 This is particularly clear when one considers that the introduced legal
origins at least in part are determined by the culture of the colonizer (its language and
religion etc.) so in the end the colonizers transmit a whole and coherent set of religion,
language and political systems to the colonized countries.
On the other hand, we can probably account for that sufficiently by controlling for
colonization and religion in the regressions. And of course, the adoption of the languages
by the colonized people in many countries was not as complete as the adoption of e.g.
the Catholic religion in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies. In many countries the old,
traditional languages stay in use or still exist parallel.19 And often the old, traditional
17 Apart from the papers of Bjørnskov, the pronoun–drop variable is also used in D’Hernoncourt and
Me´on (2012) as a instrument for trust and in Gorodnichenko and Roland (2010) as instrument for
culture (individualism).
18 The so called “Saphir-Whorf-Hypothesis” that the language change the weltanschauung of the speakers
and shape the way they look on the world is widely discussed in sociology and linguistic (e.g. Whorf
1956; Kashima and Kashima 1998).
19 For example in Paraguay where, according to Lewis (2009) the great majority of the people (78.8 %)
still speak Paraguayan Guarani. Furthermore, according to CIA (2011) Guarani and Spanish are the
two official languages of Paraguay.
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languages are mixed with the languages of the colonizer so the effects of language and
culture cannot be studied so easy in that context. A last argument in favour of the use
of the pronoun drop variable might also be that many colonies are already populated
by Europeans in majority when the legal origins are introduced. The Indian population
was often mixed with the European settlers or was decimated through ethnic genocide
(e.g. Rubinstein 2004, pp. 45).20 However, we will construct a proxy without the
pronoun-drop variable to ensure that it does not bias our result.
The monarchy dummy -—one of the most robust covariates of generalized trust— is
even more problematic. Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011, p. 4) justify the use of this variable
with the argument that the transition to democracy might differ among high and low
trust countries. In high trust countries democracies were introduced less violently and
without the necessity to completely abolish the king. In the view of the author the
fact that high trust countries maintain their monarchs might reflect the affinity of high
trust societies to stick to less formal and anonymous institutions and to put greater
emphasis on direct human relations. Maybe they also had not experienced such a great
abuse of power through the monarch as in a country where people not as trusting and
therefore also not as trustworthy. In this interpretation the monarchy dummy would
time-constant factors of trust conserved over centuries. But of course one cannot rule out
that the decision not to abandon the monarchy was influenced by a rise in generalized
trust caused by the institutional environment i.e. the legal traditions. Thus we will
present also proxies that do not include this variable.
The third variable employed by Bjørnskov is the minimum temperature in the coldest
month of the year. According to him the idea behind that variable is that similar to
an old argument of Aristotle in countries with hard and cold winters in the past people
were more dependent on the help of strangers and individuals outside the family. He
argues that if this is true generalized trust might be an evolutionary dominant strategy
because it helps to interact with such strangers (Bergh and Bjørnskov 2011, p. 4). The
notion that trust is influenced by climate is also supported by Durante (2009, pp. 25).
He shows that trust is higher in regions with more erratic weather i.e. with a higher
volatility in temperature and precipitation. The exogeneity of such climatic variable is
without doubt.
In general, to look at geographical, climatic or bio-geographical covariates of trust
in addition to cultural variables seems to be a good strategy to ensure exogeneity even
20 A special case in this respect is also the fact that in some South and Central American countries the
indigenous population was partly replaced by African slaves (e.g. Osterhammel 2006; Engerman and
Sokoloff 1994).
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to events happened in the distant past. It is therefore valuable that in two papers
Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) and Ashraf and Galor (2011a) show some additional channels
through which such factors could influence the stable component of trust. Both papers
investigate the historical determinants of ethnic/ genetic fractionalization important
covariates of trust. The former for example shows that especially latitude and the time
since settlement seem to be robust determinants of ethnic fractionalization and therefore
could also be linked to trust.
In addition Ashraf and Galor (2011a) show the negative effect of migratory distance
from the origin of mankind in Ethiopia on genetic diversity which is in turn linked to
ethnic fractionalization (Ahlerup and Olsson 2012, p. 26). They additionally estimate
that if migratory distance from Ethiopia (or to be precise: the genetic diversity predict
by the migratory distance) is significantly negatively related to contemporary trust and
that ethnic fractionalization becomes insignificant when predicted diversity is included
in the regression. Because the time since human settlement seems to be influenced
mainly through latitude and the migratory distance from Ethiopia one easily can link
both papers as the authors also do (e.g. Ahlerup and Olsson 2012 pp. 24).
In general the correlation between all this variables is high and the connections are
quite complex. Latitude seems obviously related to all of these variables. It is highly
correlated with the average temperature as well as the minimum temperature in the
coldest month, the migratory distance from Ethiopia and the time since human settle-
ment. Furthermore it reaches the highest possible degree of exogeneity. For this reason
we will use latitude as one of our additional variables to construct the trust proxy. We
will also use the time since human settlement. On the one hand to capture its more
clear-cut relation to ethnic fractionalization on the other hand because the time since
human settlement might also affect trust and development because older societies had
more time to develop successful concepts and values of social interaction.
But there is a second and even more interesting channel that justifies the use of these
variables. That is the relation of genetic diversity and latitude to the population density
in 1500 AD. This relation is the main point of the Ashraf and Galor (2011a) paper
where they found an inverted U-shaped relation between genetic diversity and economic
development measured by the population density in 1500 AD. This relationship reflects
the two opposing effects genetic diversity exerts on economic development. On the one
hand, it hinders economic development (and the emergence of trust) through its positive
impact on ethnic fractionalization. On the other hand, it enhances development through
its positive effect on the ability of societies to adopt new technologies thereby expanding
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the production possibilities of the society (increasing TFP). So, by including latitude
and time since human settlement we might also capture some of these causal linkages
Economic development as such is highly relevant for trust because —-especially in the
early days— it might reflect a culture of creativity, intellectual openness and individuality
that is associated with higher trust. Moreover, already in the middle age higher economic
development was connected with the existence of a favourable institutional environment
(e.g. the existence of guilds etc.) that also could have affected trust positively.21
In consequence, we also consider variables that measure the level of development more
directly. As a first variable that could capture the impact of economic development
we use the time since the Neolithic Revolution constructed by Putterman (2008) as a
variable to construct the proxy. According to Diamond (2007) the Neolithic Revolution
triggered technological progress and societal and economic development. His argument
is that an earlier occurrence of the Neolithic Revolution (caused by favourable (bio-
)geographic conditions) is associated with an earlier development and hence for a given
point in time probably with a higher level of development (“Early Start Advantage”).
As e.g. discovered by Ashraf and Galor (2011) this variable is a robust predictor of
the economic development in 1500 AD. And it even has significant predictive power for
today’s differences in per capita income (e.g. Putterman 2008; Olsson and Hibbs 2004,
2005). Additionally, it is also worthwhile to include this variable because the differences
in the timing of the Neolithic Revolution might themselves be caused by differences in
the trust levels already existing in those very early days and might prevailed till now.
As a second measure for the economic development in 1500 AD we employ the index
of technological adaption developed by Comin et al. (2010). Its inclusion is justified
because it contains some components that account for the transportation and commu-
nication technologies that were in use in 1500 AD. If communication and transportation
were easy transaction costs were possibly low what according to Labonne and Chase
(2010) might have increased the trust level. In addition it might reflect better knowl-
edge diffusion in a society that could at least in part result from a higher trust (higher
intellectual openess and creativity). The index of technological adaption highly proba-
ble also captures some persistent characteristics of countries since it predicts the level
of economic development today. Moreover the degree of technological adaption in 0 AD
and 1000 BC predicts an considerable amount of the degree of technological adaption
in 1500 AD (Comin et al. 2010). So, one might speculate whether one of the persistent
21 Alternatively, we might argue to the contrary that a high economic development in 1500 AD was the
result of an already existing high level of trust. This high level of trust could have enhanced both
economic development and social interactions despite the widely absence of sophisticated institutional
arrangements, sanctions and enforcement mechanisms.
15
factors that lead to this observation is the time-invariant part of trust. In any case, they
should be adequate proxies for economic development in 1500 AD and therefore could
be employed in our analysis.
Finally, we also add the population density itself to the variables we use to proxy the
trust level in 1500 AD. The reason for that is clear and follows from the argumentation
in this paragraph. There are two additional reasons for this choice. At first population
density data for 1500 AD is available for 106 of the overall 114 countries in our sample.
This could guarantee a larger sample size as for the technological adaption index or the
time since human settlement or the Neolithic Revolution because these are available for
not more than 80 countries. Secondly, when included together with measures for culture
and geography it might capture much more of the time-variant parts of the trust in 1500
than other two variables. We use all these variables only to construct the proxies if they
are significant predictors of today trust levels measured by the survey question.
We also try to include variables that represent as much of the time-invariant stable
components of trust as well as variables that measure the level of some time-variant
trust relevant determinants in 1500 AD. With this strategy we try to capture as much
of the actual level of generalized trust in 1500 AD. These considerations lead us to the
choice of four different combinations of the variables introduced above. We regress these
variables on the contemporary trust scores and predict the fitted values. These fitted
values are then included in equation (10) as proxies for the level of trust in 1500 AD.
The results of these regressions are shown in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
The fitted values resulting from the regression of the monarchy dummy, the pronoun-
drop variable and the technological adaption index in 1500 AD on trust (column (1))
are used as the regular proxy in the analysis in the next section. This is because they
explain over 50 % of the overall variance in the contemporary trust score, the most of all
regressions. All three variables are significant at 1 % level. The fitted values generated
from the estimation in column (2) where we regress latitude, the population density in
1500 AD and the pronoun-drop variable we use as a second proxy. With that we control
whether the results of our estimation change if we do not include the “problematic”
monarchy dummy and employ a much larger sample. The larger sample size is the most
important argument for the use of that fitted values although they explain only 30 % of
the variance in today’s generalized trust and that the population density and latitude
are only significant at 5 % level.
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However, to ensure that our results are not driven by outliers, extreme samples or
measurement error, we conduct a series of robustness checks. At first, we again report
bootstrapped standard errors and re-estimate the regressions in column (1) and (2) with
the trust score from the alternative sample as dependent variable (column (5) and (6)).
The results change little. With the other sample of trust scores, we explain only 40 %
of the variance with our first set of variables instead of 50 %. But this is still enough to
get meaningful results we suppose. Technological adaption is a little bit less significant
but it clear above the 5 % level.
Additionally, we conduct for every of the regression in columns (1), (2) and (5), (6)
a jackknife task, re-estimating the sample 80 or 106 times respectively and each time
excluding one country. In the Appendix Tables B.2 - B.5 the results of those are reported
(the highest and the lowest coefficient values and the respective country excluded in each
case).
At last, we use the fitted values of two other regressions as proxies. These we will
use only for robustness checks for particular regressions. The fitted values resulting
from the regressions in column (3) and (7) where we employ the technological adaption
index in 1500 AD, the time since Neolithic Revolution and the logarithm of the time
since human settlement as explanatory variables we will use to check our results for
sub-samples that consist only out of former colonies. This is because the two potentially
problematic variables monarchy and pronoun-drop are not included there. The problem
with that regression is that only 68 observations could be used to predict the fitted
values and in consequence to estimate equation one. The last fitted values we use to
check robustness result from the regressions in column (4) and (8) were we use the three
variables employed by Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011). But since they contain the doubtful
pronoun-drop and monarchy variable we will not use them on regular basis despite the
fact that they would allow to use the full sample for the analysis.
Having introduced the historical trust proxies in the remainder of this section we turn
to the measurement of the different legal origins and to the description of our control
variables.
3.3. The Measurement of Legal Origins
The third main variable we employ is the type of a country’s legal system (its legal origin).
We classify the legal origins according to the new coding developed by Klerman et al.
(2011) instead of the coding following La Porta et al. (2008) almost exclusively used in
the previous literature. The major difference of this new coding is that it classifies some
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countries as “mixed legal origins” (Klerman et al 2011, pp. 7). This seems appropriate
because there are some countries for which colonial history and legal tradition do not
coincide. In these countries the legal systems contain elements of both common law and
civil law. Most of these countries were first colonized by a country that implemented
some kind of civil law (e.g. France, the Netherlands or the Ottoman Empire). Later
these countries were conquered by England but the British changed only parts of the
already existing legal system. Therefore it seems to be important to distinguish between
pure common law countries and those with a mixed legal system. This is the case
because these mixed legal origin countries with their possibly inconsistent institutional
environment could bias our results for the common law countries in one or the other
direction.
Supplementary such mixed legal origin countries in principle were subject to an addi-
tional exogenous institutional change compared to other countries what also could lead
to biased results.22 Nevertheless we use the alternative legal origin coding of La Porta
et al. (2008) for robustness checks.
Altogether, there are 21 British common law countries, 58 French civil law countries,
eleven countries with mixed legal origin, 18 with German legal origin and five with
Scandinavian legal origin in our sample. In Table A.2 in the Appendix there is an
overview over all countries in the sample, their trust scores and legal origin coding.
Albeit the legal origins literature has shown that there are measurable differences
between the different legal traditions they remain very broadly defined. Due to this
not all of their features might be important in our context. Therefore, we also use
some measures for institutional features related to the different legal traditions and to
trust for our empirical estimations. As such disaggregated measures for institutions
we use following various studies of the empirical institutions and trust research (e.g.
Berggren and Jordahl 2006; Heinemann and Tanz 2008) the Economic Freedom in the
World Index (EFI) from Gwartney et al. (2011). We take the index values from 2009.
Additionally we make use of three of the Dimensions of the Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WGI) from the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2010), namely the “Rule of
Law” the “Regulatory Quality” and the “Control of Corruption” components again from
2009. We choose these two indicators for several reasons. At first, these indices are widely
22 It is quite likely that e.g. South Africa which was a Dutch colony for almost 150 years before the
British conquered it at the end of the 18th century was already imprinted by the kind of civil law the
Dutch imposed. This means civil law could already has influenced the trust level in these countries
—in a positive or negative way depending on their initial trust level. Therefore it could have changed
their reaction to the imposition of parts of common law by the new British Colonizer, compared to
a situation without colonization before.
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used in the literature and thus our results are comparableto previous work. Second, these
indicators are available for almost all countries in our sample what is favorable from an
econometric point of view. Third, especially the two components “Legal Structure and
Property Rights” and “Regulation of Labor, Credit and Business” of the EFI seem to be
related to exactly that kind of institutions related to the legal origins. Furthermore the
EFI Index data contains also some relatively fine grained and disaggregated measures
of particular institutional features like its component C.3 “Bureaucracy Cost” that are
probably much more valid and clear cut than the aggregated areas of the EFI or the
WGI. Especially since Bjørnskov (2010, p. 331) and Langbein and Knack (2010) notice
that the different dimensions of the WGI are very highly correlated, defined very broadly
and therefore probably measure all the same broad concept. So, they are maybe not
adequate to measure such a latent concept like legal origins that is empirical identifiable
maybe only in some very special and specific institutional features.
Consequently, we do include various measures of actual judicial and regulatory rules
additionally to some measures of institutional outcomes. Furthermore, we use some
specific measures for the characterization of legal systems developed in the legal origin
literature. At first we adopt three variables constructed by Klerman et al (2011) to
measure the differences in the judicial systems of the particular legal traditions. These
are the use of Juries in court cases (Juries), the institutional acceptance and implemen-
tation of case law instead of codified law (Caselaw) and whether Supreme Court judges
in a country have a constitutionally guaranteed life long tenure (Tenure). Additionally,
we use a variable that we adopt form La Porta et al. (2008), namely an index that
measures the formalism of legal procedures by the time it takes to collect a bounced
check (La Porta et al 2008, pp. 293). From this source we also adopt our measure for
labor market regulation (Labor Market Regulation) and for the Regulation of Market
Entry (an index that counts the number of steps that is necessary to open a business).
At last, we use the “Democ” variable from the Polity IV project database to measure
the degree of institutionalized democracy in a country.
3.4. Control Variables
Our control variables are collected from eleven different sources. The measure of ethnic
fractionalization stems from Alesina et al. (2003). From the Barro and Lee education
dataset (Barro and Lee 2010) we take the variable for the average years of total schooling
of the population above 25 and the percentage of population that is aged over 25 that
attained secondary education, both measured in 2010. From the CIA World Fact Book
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(CIA 2011) we take the variable for the age structure of a country (number of people
between 15 and 64) and the Gini coefficient. The age variable is from 2009, the Gini
variable reports the latest available values. From the Penn World Tables (Heston et al.
2011) we take the PPP converted real GDP per capita in 2009 and our openness measure
(Openness) that is the share of imports and exports of the real GDP also for 2009. The
share of a countries population that is Muslim, Catholic or Protestant is taken from La
Porta et al. (1999). As geographical controls we employ the Latitude of a country in
absolute degrees from Parker (1997) and the index of malaria risk from Sachs (2003).
The population density and the urbanization rate in 1500 AD we adopt from Acemoglu
et al. (2002). At last, dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and post-communistic countries
are employed to account for the systematically lower trust scores of these countries. The
former dummy is coded by the author the latter follows the coding of Bjørnskov and
Me´on (2010). With this list the author supposes all variables that are used as controls
or that are identified to be relevant covariates of generalized trust by the literature are
covered so omitted variable bias seems to be at least no particularly problematic issue.
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1. Trust and Legal Origins – The Connection
In this section we test hypothesis one, whether legal traditions and trust are connected
with each other through specific arrangements and features of the legal and regulatory
system of a country. The economic legal origins literature (e.g. Botero et al. 2004;
Djankov et al. 2002; La Porta et al. 1999; La Porta et al. 2004 and La Porta et al.
2008) typically investigates the relation of legal origins to three different areas of the
institutional continuum:
• The effect of different legal origins on the regulation of financial markets, creditor
rights and investor protection.
• The impact of legal origins on government regulation of particular economic activ-
ities and the extent to which the state acts as owner of banks or other business
branches.
• And at last the literature analyses the consequences of different legal traditions on
the characteristics, that is the functioning, design and formalism of the legal system.
The literature usually found that civil law is characterized through stronger and more
rigid regulation, for example of market entry or the labour market than common law
(e.g. Botero et al. 2004; Djankov et al. 2002 or La Porta et al. 2008, pp. 294). Common
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law in contrary is associated with lower formalism of judicial procedures, longer judicial
tenures and higher prevalence of case law (La Porta et al. 2004; La Porta et al. 2008,
pp. 297). Finally, this research concludes that civil law countries in general have a
lower protection of shareholders and creditors, inefficient possibilities to enforce debt, a
higher government ownership and control of financial institutions (La Porta et al. 2008,
p. 294). In the following we focus on the relation between legal origins, regulation of
labor markets and market entry, the features of the legal system and trust.23
As a first step we regress the legal origin dummies on the trust scores and a set of
controls. That is we estimate the following equation:
Trusti = α+ β′LOi + γ′Xi + ui (1)
Where LOi is a vector of dummy variables for the different legal origins. Xi is a vector
of appropriate control variables. ui represents the error term capturing the influence of
unobserved factors. The results of these estimations are reported in Table 2. In column
(1) of Table 2 we add variables for the share of Protestants, Muslims and Catholics to the
legal origin dummies and then up till column (7) in each column we include a different
control variable to the religion variables and the legal origin dummies. These are ethnic
fractionalization, years of schooling, the share of people between 15 and 64, the latitude
in absolute degrees a dummy for constitutional monarchies, post-communistic and Sub-
Saharan Africa countries and the logarithm of the GDP per capita. In column (8) we
for the first time include all the controls in one equation. Then we also add our measure
for openness and in the last column the Gini coefficient to the full specification. We add
the Gini coefficient only to the full specification because it is found to be one of the most
robust covariates of trust (e.g. Berggren and Jordahl 2006; Bjørnskov 2006, 2008).
We think that in the full specification in column (10) almost all relevant variables that
are considered to be possible covariates of trust by the previous literature are included
(e.g. in Algan and Cahuc 2010; Alesina and Ferrara 2002; Berggren and Jordahl 2006;
Bergh and Bjørnskov 2011; Bjørnskov 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010; Bjørnskov and Me´on
2010; D’Hernoncourt and Me´on 2012; La Porta et al. 1997; Roth 2009 and O¨zcan and
Bjørnskov 2011). In almost all estimations the legal origin dummies are insignificant
– apart from the Scandinavian legal origin dummy that is marginally significant two
23 We do not establish that there is no relation between trust and creditor or investor protection or
that these areas are not relevant in that context, but we will concentrate our attention on the other
areas. In addition, since we also include some aggregated measures of regulation as well as the EFI
component of credit market regulation in the analysis we at least in part cover also these aspect in
our investigation.
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times. Concerning the covariates we confirm and replicate to a large extend the results
of Bjørnskov (2006). Like him our results suggest that being a constitutional monarchy,
the Gini coefficient, being Catholic and having a communistic past are robustly related to
generalized trust. Additionally, we report also a significantly lower trust in Sub-Saharan
Africa and in Muslim countries in the most of ours specifications.
To validate the stability of our results we conduct several robustness checks reported
in Table B.1 in the Appendix. For example we regress the model of column (10) with
the trust scores of our alternative trust score sample described in section three and
with the alternative legal origin coding of La Porta et al. (2008) (columns (1) – (3)). In
columns (4) to (7) we re-estimate the regressions of column (1) to (3) using bootstrapped
standard errors to rule out that the results are driven by outliers or an extreme sample.
Finally in columns (8) – (10) we add additional controls (malaria risk in 1994, population
density and urbanization rates in 2010 or 2009, respectively) and employ another measure
for education (share of people with secondary education instead of average years of
schooling). Nothing changes substantially due to these robustness checks. The new
or alternative controls are insignificant and what was robust in the baseline regression
continues to be robust. The only slight change we can detect is that being a Muslim
now is even more robust and significantly negative related to trust than before.
Some of the controls used in these regressions are probably endogenous. For example
the ethnic fractionalization variable enters with a positive sign in the most of the re-
gression what is quiet counter-intuitive and not in line with previous findings. Possibly
this is due to the fact that ethnic fractionalization is also influenced through trust or
both variables are influenced through a third variable like e.g. genetic diversity. This
is suggested by some very recent research for example of Ashraf and Galor (2011a) or
Ahlerup and Olsson (2012). Furthermore, Bjørnskov (2006) argue that of the variables
included in our specification possibly also the Gini coefficient, the real GDP per capita
and the education measure are endogenous. Moreover, we also instrument our Open-
ness measure because its endogeneity is quite likely since it is a component of the real
GDP per capita that we consider to be endogenous. We address this issue by running
Instrumental Variables (IV) estimates for every of these variables. To be precise, we do
Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) regressions of equation one.24 The
results are shown in Table 3.
24 This estimation method has better small sample properties and is most often more efficient than the
standard 2SLS method, especially in the presence of weak instruments. Its confidence intervals are
more reliable and it is unbiased in the median when the instruments are weak (Stock and Yogo 2005).
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In a first estimation (Panel B column (1)) we use the dummy variable “pronoun-drop”
indicating whether it is possible to drop the personal pronoun in spoken language or
not as a first instrument for ethnic fractionalization. As second excluded instrument
an index of technological adaption in 1500 AD developed by Comin et al. (2010) is
used.25 In the first-stage, we regress both on ethnic fractionalization including all other
exogenous variables from the regression in Table 3 column (10) as controls.
[Table 2 about here]
Both instrumental variables are highly significant and negatively related to ethnic
fractionalization. Thus, relevance of the instruments could be assumed.26 In the second
stage, ethnic fractionalization is significant at 5 % level and enters with the expected
negative sign and a large coefficient. Accordingly, a Hausman test shows that exogeneity
of ethnic fractionalization can be rejected at 1 % level. Second, we repeat the same
procedure but this time instrumenting the Gini coefficient by the time since Neolithic
Revolution variable, the population density in 1500 AD and the latitude. Again, we
estimate that latitude and the time since agricultural transition are relevant and valid
instruments.
[Table 3 about here]
The Gini now is insignificant in the second-stage but at least its sign stays negative.
However, the endogeneity test does not reject exogeneity of the Gini coefficient. This is
a result in line with the findings of Bjørnskov (2006, pp. 13).
In a third LIML estimation we employ the years since Neolithic Revolution, latitude
and the natural logarithm of the Frankel-Romer predicted trade share as instruments for
the real GDP per capita and the openness variable. Once more, all statistical tests show
that these instruments are relevant and valid although of the three employed instruments
only the Frankel-Romer predicted trade share is a significant predictor of our openness
measure. The result is that real GDP per capita now becomes marginally significant at
25 Both seem arguably to be exogenous and pass as shown in Panel A of Table 3 the Sargan statistics.
Since the technological adaption index in could be seen as a valid proxy for the level of development
in 1500 AD and development is probably negatively affected by ethnic fractionalization there is a
clear theoretical link between both. The time since Neolithic Revolution could also be seen as a
proxy for today’s economic development. Complementary, the pronoun-drop variable could reflect a
collectivistic, family- or nation-centered culture that is maybe detrimental for ethnic fractionalization
and a diverse culture. We will introduce and discuss this and the other instrumental variables later
on in section 4.2.
26 In addition, a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions indicates that the instruments are also valid.
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the second stage. Openness remains insignificant. In this case, the test for endogeneity
cannot reject the joint exogeneity of openness and GDP per capita.27
At last, we instrument the years of schooling variable with latitude and the population
density in 1500 AD. As before the instruments seem to be strong. The variable never-
theless remains insignificant but now shows a – more intuitive- positive sign. The test
of endogeneity once more cannot reject exogeneity also of the education variable. Using
OLS instead seems therefore the better choice. For the other variables nothing changes
considerably, i.e. the monarchies, post-communistic and Sub-Saharan African countries
as well as the countries with a high share of Catholics seem to differ significantly from
other countries. Of course, only the share of Catholics and the monarchy dummy are
significant in every of the first stages and the mixed and German legal origin dummies
are significant in one regression each. But we should not stress these differences very
much since apart from ethnic fractionalization all variables are probably exogenous and
therefore the OLS estimates are the correct ones. In sum, endogeneity seems not to be
a big issue in our sample and do not change the results remarkably. The only exception
might be ethnic fractionalization that seems to be endogenous probably due to reverse
causality that causes a downwards bias. However, the results regarding the legal origins
are almost completely unaffected by these issues.
But let us now return to the analysis of our main variables. Unfortunately the legal
origins are still insignificant even after controlling for many factors. Does this mean that
they are not relevant and do not matter for trust as for example La Porta et al. (2008)
suppose? Maybe an even more detailed analysis is necessary. Obviously there is still
too much heterogeneity in the sample or alternatively we did not take into account some
factors that are decisive for the identification of the effects of legal origins on trust. To
uncover the effects of legal origins we conduct a more differentiated analysis. The results
of these regressions are presented in Table 4.
In the first two estimations reported in this table we regress trust on the legal origin
dummies and all robust covariates from Table 2 column (10). We also add a dummy that
indicates whether a country is a former colony or not and exclude all post-communistic
countries from these regressions. Furthermore, in columns (1) and (2) the sample is
restricted on countries with below and above median values in the index of institution-
alized democracy from the Polity IV project. What is the motivation for that sample
restrictions and modifications?
27 If one tests the endogeneity of the GDP per capita only or instruments both variables separately, this
would not change this result. The exogeneity of the Ln (GDP per capita) cannot be rejected in every
of these cases. (regressions available upon request).
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Concerning the colonies the argument is that colonies differ enormously from not
colonized countries in many aspects. Some of these aspects are also relevant for our
analysis. For example the most colonies had to adopt their legal system from their
colonizer (La Porta et al. 2008, p. 288). And even when they choose their legal
system voluntarily after the become independent (like some of the former Spanish and
Portuguese colonies in the 19th century) they are already shaped by the culture and
religion of their former colonizers and very often, at least in South America, the Indian
population was almost fully replaced or at least mixed with settlers of European origin.
So the choice of the legal origins was not fully exogenous for these countries.
[Table 4 about here]
But of course, colonization was a very complex process that had quite different conse-
quences for every colonized country depending on by which particular country it became
colonized, its geographical location, its endowment with resources and the stage of de-
velopment it had already reached when colonized. So, there are many reasons why we
have to expect that these countries although they themselves are still a quite heteroge-
neous group of countries differ systematically from the not colonized countries.28 They
all were subject to the same treatment that was connected with a deep and fundamental
exogenous cultural and institutional change.
The exclusion of post-communistic countries follows the same logic. These countries
are also significantly different from the other countries and had a very special and change-
ful history regarding their legal traditions.Most of them had already adopted some legal
tradition when they became communistic after World War II and the formation of the
Soviet Union. Their legal system was then modified according to socialistic ideas. Af-
ter the breakdown of the iron curtain and the socialistic regimes these countries once
more choose a new design for the legal system more or less voluntary but certainly not
independent from their previous history.
28 That the era of colonization was is a quite complex period that cannot be handled easily by empirical
research is for example emphasized by Olsson (2009). He argues that the period of colonialism has to
be divided in two different phases, the mercantilist phase (meaning the colonization of Latin Amer-
ica through the Spanish and Portuguese) and the imperialist phase (meaning the colonial activities
of Britain, France and other European states in late 19th century). Of course, this distinction is
appropriate especially for the analysis of the consequences of colonialism for development. Never-
theless, to highlight the fact that one has to distinguish both waves of colonialism is useful also for
our purposes. We take this into account in our later empirical investigations by treating some early
Spanish or Portuguese colonies as countries with endogenous legal origin. This choice results from
the fact that they become independent in the early 19th century at a time where the legal origins
are already not fully developed even Spain or Portugal. In consequence, assuming exogenous legal
origins for these countries seems to be much more doubtful than for many African countries that
become colonies decades later.
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At last, the argument for separating the sample in democratic and less democratic
countries is straight forward. The impact of legal traditions could only show up em-
pirically if the institutional arrangements connected with them function in the way
theoretically assumed. What is the value of using juries in court cases when the juries
are corrupt? And what if there is case law as source of law or a high judicial indepen-
dence exists according to the officially written down law but a country is reigned by an
autocrat who enforces his will anyway? The idea here is to address the maybe existing
difference between actual institutional outcomes and the legal rules and constraints men-
tioned. However, the result of the regression for the less democratic countries (column
(1)) is that French legal origin now enters with a positive sign and the colony dummy
is strongly significant. On average, colonies show around 21 percentage points less trust
than not colonized countries.
This is a clear indication that the distortions of colonialism had strongly negative
consequences on generalized trust. Alternatively the bad performance of the colonies
could also be caused due to inferior geographic or climatic condition or due to their
greater ethnic diversity. If we indeed control for both (not reported) these variables are
not significant and the coefficient of the colony dummy becomes even more negative.29
But how should we interpret the positive sign of the French legal origin dummy?
Technically the interpretation is easy: In countries with a low level of democracy and
therefore also low rule of law French legal origin seems to be favourable for trust. From
the viewpoint of theory these finding is interpretable in different ways. A possible story
is that if French legal origin (high and rigid regulation, centralized bureaucracy etc.) is
introduced in a country where the trust level out of diverse reasons is already low it is
consistent with the beliefs of people and therefore the already existing low trust does
not fall. When in contrast in such an environment common law is introduced this will
lead —-according to the Aghion et al. model— to a huge decline in trust, so that these
countries may end up with less trust than French civil law countries. But of course this
story rests on the assumption that the countries were already autocratic or low trusting
when the legal origins were introduced. This has to be examined in greater detail, of
course. Another story would be that the different legal origins are not always adopted
equally well in every country depending on for example culture. If for instance common
law would be introduced in a Islamic country with a very collectivistic culture and low
affinity to democracy it maybe work not as good as civil law and is not adopted and
internalized by the people. Since almost the half of all countries in this sub-sample are
Islamic and apart from four (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Thailand and Yemen) all
29 Not shown but available from the author upon request.
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are former colonies such a story might be true. Maybe we will get a clearer answer after
the analysis in the next section.
The results for the countries with a better democracy score (column (2)) are not so
unexpected. The sign of the French legal origin dummy is negative but it is insignif-
icant. The Gini coefficient becomes significant again and the colony dummy loses its
significance. The latter indicates that the much lower trust of colonies can be traced
back to a deficit in democratic institutions and not to other factors. In general there
are remarkable differences between both samples. The model performs much better for
the democratic countries explaining more than 80 % of the variance in the trust scores
while it only explains around two third of the variance in the trust scores of the less
democratic countries.
In the last column (3) we continue to follow the same logic. But instead of using a
very broadly defined measure of democracy we use the control of corruption scores from
the Worldbank. This indicator is a more precise measure of what we are interested in:
are the government, the officials, judges, bureaucrats etc. in a society corrupt or not?
Do the institutions work well or can one act against the law if one is rich or powerful
enough? We have seen already in the columns (1) and (2) that there is a difference
depending on whether there is democracy or not. In regression (3) we again consider
the whole sample.30 Therefore dummies for the post-communistic countries and former
colonies are added to the specification. Moreover, we include a dummy variable that is
one for countries that are above the average in the control of corruption score, i.e. have
low corruption. We then interact this dummy with the legal origin dummies.31. The low
corruption dummy itself is highly significant and shows a positive sign. Low corruption
is thus associated with high trust, as predicted by the Aghion et al. (2010) and others.
Most interesting, French legal origin countries with low corruption show significantly less
trust than for example their British counterparts. This effect is such high that common
law countries exhibit even higher trust levels than the French legal origin countries unlike
their basic trust level —indicated by the positive sign of the French legal origin dummy—
30 This is motivated primarily to make use of the advantages of a larger sample size. Our results
concerning the interaction terms and the low corruption dummy would also hold if we would exclude
the post-communistic countries as in the regressions before (regression available upon request).
31That is equation (1) is extended to:
Trusti = α+ β′1LOi + β2 ∗ LOWCORRi + ρ′LOi ∗ LOWCORRi + γ′Xi + ui
Where we are interested in the coefficient-vector ρ
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is lower.32 This maybe indicates that when the institutions in these countries work like
they should the more rigid regulation and the more centralized bureaucracy show indeed
their detrimental effect on trust. Apart from the little bit strange negative overall effect
of less corruption in mixed legal origin countries low corruption is in general related to
higher trust also something in line with our expectations.
In a certain sense the result is quite logical. In common law countries people that act
in institutions like judges or so have much more freedom and power so they can abuse
this freedom for their own purposes. In more regulated French legal origin countries
trust in general might be lower and corruption might be higher but nevertheless the
opportunities to get corrupt and the damage that created by its maybe lower. So, the
reaction to changes in the incentive structure of a society are maybe more distinctive in
common law countries that is the “good equilibrium” with more trust is also the more
sensible and unstable. But one hast to be cautious in drawing such conclusions from
these results since the model of Aghion et al. (2010) suggests that the level of corruption
itself might be endogenously determined by the level of trust in a society.
However, the main message of these regressions is: In democracies and when corruption
is low that is the institutions work in the way they are designed the impact of legal origins
is much more visible and prevalent than when one only looks at all countries that are
aggregated under a legal tradition. This is also important to notice with respect to
the finding of La Porta et al. (2008, pp. 313) that the significant differences between
civil and common law they estimate also hold in autocratic countries. Again, we do not
deal with the obvious question whether or under which conditions the implemented legal
systems themselves endogenously lead to more or less corruption.
As the next step of this general analysis we regress selected features of the judicial
and regulatory system we found significantly related to legal origins on trust. These
regressions are reported in Table 5. There we estimate the following specification:
Trusti = α+ β′INSTi + γ′Xi + ui (2)
Where INSTi is a vector of institutional measures associated with the different legal
traditions and Xi is a vector of appropriate control variables. ui represents the error
term capturing the influence of unobserved factors. In the first three estimations we
regress the total EFI index score in 2009, its relevant areas and five controls (the Gini
coefficient, the post-communism dummy, the monarchy dummy and the shares of Mus-
32 If one adds up the coefficients the trust level of French legal origin countries with low corruption is
-3.975 percentage points lower than that of common law countries with high corruption (the base
group here).
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lims and Catholics) on trust. Only the total score is related to trust after including these
controls. From the three variables for the design of legal institutions only case law as
source of law seems to be significantly related to trust (column (4)). Low corruption as
expected is attended by high trust clearly indicating the importance of beliefs for trust.
It is dubious why rule of law enters with a significant negative sign. But because the
control of corruption variable enters significant and with positive sign this is likely to be
a consequence of the already mentioned high correlation between these three measures
especially between the two dimensions of the governance indicators rule of law and con-
trol of corruption (0.96).Formalism of the judicial system something very high especially
in Scandinavian countries seems not to be significant in the first regression (column
(6)). Interestingly, a higher labour market regulation is highly significantly associated
with higher trust. This is not only caused by the Scandinavian countries because when
they are excluded (regression not reported) the coefficient is somewhat lower but re-
mains positive and significant at 5 % level. But if we use an alternative index e.g. the
labour market regulation component from the EFI apart from credit market regulation
everything becomes insignificant. This result needs to be investigated further in future
research.
Apart from all that, the far most interesting results are shown in columns (8) to (11).
In column (8) and (9) we repeat the regression from column (6) but in column (8) we
only include countries with an above average score in the control of corruption index. In
column (9) we then restrict the sample to observations with an above median value in
the rule of law dimension of the Worldwide Governance Indicators. The consequences
are conspicuously. The size of the formalism index coefficient increases by more than
60 times and it becomes now at least marginally significant. The same holds true for
columns (10) and (11) where the model in column (4) is re-estimated for a sub-sample of
countries that exhibit above median scores in the index of institutionalized democracy
already used in the table before.
[Table 5 about here]
All three measures (tenure, case law and juries) become significant and the size of the
coefficients increased remarkably. The unexpected sign of the tenure variable is presum-
ably driven by the Scandinavian countries that all have no constitutionally guaranteed
life-long tenure for their Supreme Court judges. If they are excluded from the sample
the tenure variable gets insignificant but the negative sign remains (regressions not re-
ported). The other two variables are unaffected from the exclusion. So, maybe a life-long
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tenure of Supreme Court judges is not such an important institutional indicator of trust
than the other two.
Finally, in column (10) we estimate the same model a third time but with a sub-
sample of countries that have below median values in the democracy score. As in the
table before we found striking differences, every variable becomes insignificant and the
R2 as well as the adjusted R2 (from 0.53 to 0.18) reduces impressively. Thus again, there
seems to be a systematic difference between democratic and less democratic countries.
The main conclusion we can derive from this estimates is clear: legal origins matter
for trust but only when the institutions work and the enforcement of law is guaranteed.
This does not mean that institutions are not as important as proposed by them but
reflects the fact that they only can matter if the legal rules and laws and the actual
functionality of the institutions do coincide.
A last thing we do in this chapter is shown in Table 6. There we show some possible
channels through which institutions and trust are connected via legal origins. We do this
by two 2SLS and one Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) estimation. First we run the
3SLS estimation (columns (1) – (4)) where we in the third stage include also the common
controls and employ the sub-sample of above median democracy score countries. The
goal of these regressions is to show the connection between case law, tenure and juries,
corruption, the second area of the EFI Index (Legal System and Property Rights) and
trust. The results are as expected (apart from the fact that tenure seems to be negatively
related to low corruption). They show that the use of juries, case law as source of
law and a life-long tenure of Supreme Court judges – institutional and constitutional
arrangements connected with legal origins- influence the level of corruption in a society.
This level of corruption in turn influences the effectiveness of the legal system and the
security of property rights (what is measured in the second area of the EFI).
Finally, the effectiveness of the legal system and the security of property rights sig-
nificantly influence the level of generalized trust in a society. In column (5) we show
the third stage of the 3SLS estimation when we include also the legal origin dummies.
The coefficient of the EFI 2 2009 variable becomes insignificant then. This indicates
that the effect of case law, juries and tenure on trust via lower corruption and better
property rights maybe do not reflect more than the impact of the respective legal origins
connected with these variables on trust.
In columns (5) – (8) we report the result of the 2SLS estimations. The first of those
show that the amount of variance in the EFI area 2 that is explained by the control of
corruption and the formalism of the legal system is significantly related to trust. This
relationship is robust to the inclusion of various control variables. In the last 2SLS
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regression we consider an alternative channel from regulation to trust via the impact of
market entry regulation on the area five of the EFI index (Regulation of Labor, Credit
and Business).
The purpose of this last 2SLS estimation is simply to show that even one single
regulatory feature connected with legal origins is a significant predictor of generalized
trust. These channels are only examples and other channels that work in the same
manner are possible and probable. We also do not postulate some hypothesis about
causality in these estimates noting that it run most likely in both directions. We simply
wanted to show that there is a connection.
We now will turn to our second and third hypotheses, i.e. we try to figure the causal
relationship between trust and the legal system.
[Table 6 about here]
4.2. Trust, Beliefs and Institutions – Assessing Causality
4.2.1. Empirical Strategy
To verify the “Aghion et al. Hypotheses” we employ two different empirical strategies.
The first of the two “Aghion et al. Hypotheses” we will investigate by conducting
IV probit regressions where we regress the dummy variables for British legal origin and
French legal origin on the variables we used to construct our historical trust “proxies”. In
these IV estimations we will restrict the sample to countries that adopt their respective
legal origin endogenously, i.e. voluntarily. Because in not all cases it is clear whether
a country adopt its legal origin endogenously or became it imposed by a conqueror or
colonizer we will consider different samples with a different composition of countries.
The “Second Aghion et al. Hypothesis” we test with a Difference in Difference like
approach were we regress the contemporary trust scores on the trust proxy (the historical
trust score in 1500 AD) and then try to explain the rest of the variance we did not control
for in plugging-in the exogenous variance. In other words, we control for trust in 1500
AD – or the stable components of trust- and try to decompose the residual into the legal
origin dummies, and control variables. This corresponds to treating the introduction of
legal origins as quasi-natural experiment and the countries that adopt a certain legal
origin are considered as treatment group while the countries that adopt another legal
system act as respective control group. Furthermore, in the specification we include
interaction terms where we interact the legal origin dummies with dummies indicating a
high or a low historical trust country. This avoids the problem of a too low sample size we
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probably have to face if we use separate samples. That is, we assess the “Second Aghion
et al. Hypothesis” by allowing the treatment effect to differ conditional on differences
in the ex-ante trust level of countries. That is we estimate the following equation:
Trusti,c = α+ β1HTRi,1500 + β2HHTi,1500 + γ′LOi,c + ρ′LOi,c ∗HHTi,1500
+ θ′Xi,c + ui
(3)
Where TRUSTi,c represents the contemporary (c) trust scores for country i as described
in chapter two. HTRi,1500 is the used proxy for historical trust in country i in 1500 AD
it consists out of the fitted values from regressions of certain suitable variables on the
contemporary trust scores we will explain and report in the next section.33 LOi,c is a
vector of dummy variables (or a categorical variable) one for each legal origin (British,
French, Mixed, German and Scandinavian legal origin) that indicates which country
has adopted which legal tradition today. As before, in every regression British legal
origin is the base group. Xi,c is a vector of control variables. Finally ui is the er-
ror term capturing unobserved factors. We interact the vector of legal origin dummies
LOi,c with a dummy variable indicating above median or above average historical trust
HHTi,1500. For identifying the effect of low historical trust HHTi,1500 is replaced by
LHTi,1500 dummy denoting countries with below average or median historical trust val-
ues. We estimate equation (2) for a sample, where we have excluded the countries with
endogenous legal origins. Then, we hopefully can estimate the pure treatment effect of
the implementation of legal origins in conquered or colonized countries.
However, we will also make use of three-way interaction terms because even when
working with two-way interaction terms, low sample size could be a problem. In this
regressions, we furthermore only will use a dummy that indicates below median historical
trust, since more countries in our sub-samples exhibit low historical trust values. That
is, we will interact the low historical trust dummy with the legal origin dummies and also
with the dummies for former colonies or colonies with exogenous legal origin according
to Klerman et al. (2011). We will run the regressions for the two sub-samples of
former European colonies identified by Acemoglu et al. (2002) and for the colonies with
exogenous legal origin according to Klerman et al. (2011). The estimated equation thus
33 Since this “proxy” for historical trust values in 1500 AD is a generated regressor we will bootstrap
our standard errors in those regressions.
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becomes the following form:
Trusti,c = α+ β1HTRi,1500 + β2LHTi,1500 + β3COLi + γ′LOi,c + ρ′1LOi,c ∗ LHTi,1500
+ ρ′2LOi,c ∗ COLi + ρ′3LHTi,1500 ∗ COLi + ρ′4LOi,c ∗ LHTi,1500 ∗ COLi
+ θ′Xi,c + ui
(4)
Where we are mainly interested in the sign and significance of the coefficient of the three-
way interaction term ρ4. LHTi,1500 is a dummy variable indicating countries with below
median historical trust values. COLi represents either a dummy variable for former
European colonies according to Acemoglu et al. 2002 or for former European colonies
with exogenous legal origin according to Klerman et al. (2011). This strategy should
allow us to identify clear causal effects of the exogenous introduction of legal origins in
countries with high and low ex-ante trust levels.
4.2.2. Results
Now we test the “First Aghion et al. Hypotheses” or the prediction that countries with
a high trust level in 1500 AD had created another legal system than countries with low
historical trust values. To identify if this is true we run IV probit estimations where
we in the first stage regress the variables we use to construct the respective proxies
on the present trust scores. In the second stage we regress this exogenous variance in
the trust scores on dummies for French legal origin and British legal origin. We only
include countries in the regression that have chosen their French or British legal origins
endogenously. Because there are different opinions about for which countries exactly
the legal origins are endogenous we repeat the IV probit estimations for three different
sub-samples. In the first sub-sample all countries that are coded as former colonies by
Acemoglu et al. (2002) are excluded from the sample, assuming that all countries that
were no colonies adopt their legal origin voluntarily.
As mentioned in chapter three Klerman et al. (2011) remarked that the assumption
that the legal system was exogenous for all colonies is probably not right. Especially the
former Spanish and Portuguese colonies were already independent when the legal origins
were fully developed and introduced in their home countries in the early 19th century.
They therefore code for example the legal origin of Brazil as endogenous because it
adopted French civil law shortly after becoming independent. When it was a colony
it had uncodified law (Klerman et al. 2011). We therefore include all countries in our
second sub-sample that were coded by Klerman et al. (2011) as having endogenous
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legal origin. In the third sub-sample we exclude also countries with a communistic past
from the sample. As mentioned earlier they are very special with respect to their legal
origins and we cannot insure that their legal origin is purely endogenous in every case.34
Furthermore we re-estimate every equation with the alternative sample of trust scores
and for every of the four historical trust proxies we have constructed. So, overall this
leads to 48 regressions. These are shown in Table 7. The results are very clear. In 41 of
the 48 regressions the trust coefficient is significant and exhibits the expected sign.
To be precise: In 23 of 24 regressions there is a negative relation between high histor-
ical trust scores and the probability that a country chooses French legal origin. In 19
of 24 regressions there is a positive relation between the historical trust scores and the
probability that a country chooses British legal origin. The results do not differ signifi-
cantly when we use the alternative sample of trust scores but as before the coefficients
are in general a little bit smaller. The results are also quite robust when we change
the variables in the first stage. We get the weakest result with the three variables of
Bjørnskov (minimum temperature, monarchy dummy and pronoun-drop variable). This
is what we expect because it perhaps is a sign that these variables are not fully ex-
ogenous. Consequently the estimated coefficients are the highest and always significant
when we use the three variables with the highest degree of exogeneity (technological
adaption in 1500, time since human settlement and time since Neolithic Revolution). In
sum we think that these results provide clear evidence in favour of the “First Aghion et
al. Hypothesis”. High trust countries choose other institutions than low trust countries.
Low trust countries are more likely to implement civil law whereas high trust countries
are more likely to implement common law.
[Table 7 about here]
At last, we test whether the “Second Aghion et al. Hypothesis” holds empirically. To
do this we will estimate equations (3) and (4).We do include only the share of Muslims
and Catholics, the measure of ethnic fractionalization and the colony dummy in every
regression. This is primarily to save some degrees of freedom what will be important
because the sample size now will become smaller. Sometimes we include the post-
communism dummy, a dummy for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa or the Gini coefficient
34 La Porta et al. (2008, p. 290) at least in the understanding of the author, suggest that legal origins
are exogenous for all countries except the home countries of the respective tradition and some few
countries like Turkey, Russia or Japan that choose their legal origin on a voluntary basis. This
might be true but unfortunately we would end up then with around sixteen countries or so. But we
cannot run a regression with such few countries. But a descriptive analysis of their historical trust
scores suggests that the results of our regressions hold also for these countries and are probably even
stronger.
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as additional controls. The Sub-Saharan Africa dummy we include again because it can
capture the various differences of these countries that are not due to the variables we
are interested in. Additionally, five of the countries that are coded as having mixed legal
origin are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. With the dummy included we can test whether
some maybe occurring differences of the mixed legal origin countries are really due to
the legal origins or due to some unobserved special characteristics of these Sub-Saharan
Africa countries.35
As already mentioned, our strategy to identify the causal effect here is only to include
countries in the sample for which the legal origin is exogenous. That means for these
countries the introduction of legal origins is equivalent to an exogenous institutional
change (or a treatment). Similar to the regressions before we construct three sub-
samples. The first sub-sample marked the upper bound of countries with exogenous
legal origin and results of the authors reading of La Porta et al. (2008). We exclude
the mother countries of the legal origins (France, Germany, Austria and the United
Kingdom) all Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden)
the countries that according to La Porta et al. (2008) and Klerman et al. (2011) adopt
their legal origin voluntarily (Japan, Russia, Thailand and Turkey) and the countries that
were colonized in majority by the British settlers (New Zealand, USA and Australia).
The second sub-sample comprises out of all colonies for which the legal origins were
exogenous according to Klerman et al. (2011). At last, in the third sample all countries
are included that are coded as former colonies by Acemoglu et al. (2002). At the
beginning, we present the estimations using the two-way interaction terms(equation
(2)). The results are presented in Table 8.36
Moreover, since the empirical trust literature traditionally suffers from outliers and
influential observations (Berggren et al. 2008; Beugelsdijk and de Groot 2004) and
our sample size now becomes much lower than before (sometimes only 30 observations)
this could be a problem likely to arise. Another, related problem already discussed in
section two is the possibility of measurement error. Additionally to the three countries
with extremely high differences between the trust scores of our two samples (Thailand,
Uruguay and Canada) the surprisingly high trust score of Saudi Arabia (around 53 %)
could be a source of measurement error. This high trust score is extremely conspicuous
because the literature as well as our own analysis suggests that Muslim countries are
significantly less trusting than other countries. On the other hand, as well known in
35 With the selection of these variables we include all variables as controls in the regressions that found
to be significant covariates of trust in the baseline regressions in Table 2.
36 In all regressions countries with British legal origin (common law) are the base-group to which we
compare.
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the development and institutions literature (Dobler 2011) the so called “oil states” are
systematically different from all other countries and often distorts empirical results e.g.
in regressions of GDP per capita on institution indices. Therefore we will investigate
what happens if we drop Saudi Arabia —-as China or the Iran— from the data set.
Secondly, we will also present a regression where Thailand, Uruguay and Canada are
removed from the sample.
To reveal potential distortions arising through outliers in the table below we follow
Rodrik et al. (2004) in computing a DFITS statistics developed by Belsey et al. (1980).
This test statistics can be used to detect influential observation that have a huge impact
on the coefficient estimates (i.e. a high leverage) or a large residual. Belsely et al. (1980)
suggest that observations with a DFITS value above the cutoff of |DFITSj | > 2
√
k \N
can be considered as influential observations (with k indicating the number of regressors
and N the denoting the number of observables in the sample). In addition, we look
at countries in the critical area of a leverage-versus-squared residual plot to graphically
detect potentially influential observations. After doing this in a first step we will drop
the three countries with the highest DFITS value (when they are above the cutoff) and
the highest leverage according to the graphical examination with the leverage-versus-
squared–residual plots. In a second step we will drop all countries with a DFITS statistics
above the critical value. At last, we will exclude Saudi Arabia and look how the estimates
change and, of course, estimate our specifications for different combinations of trust score
samples and historical trust proxies.
If we look at the regression results in Table 8 we can conclude that there is much
evidence that confirms the “Second Aghion et al. Hypothesis”. To see this we have to
look for example at the coefficients for the British legal origin and French legal origin
interaction terms. In ten of the 16 regressions in both Panels of Table 8 these are included
simultaneously enabling a direct comparison between both. If the “Second Aghion et
al. Hypothesis” is true we should expect that the coefficient of the interaction term of
British legal origin and low historical trust is negative and significant. Conversely, we
expect a positive significant sign if the British legal origin dummy is interacted with a
dummy indicating high historical trust. That is, the exogenous introduction of common
law in a country with low initial trust should be associated with a decline in trust relative
to a country with high ex-ante trust where common law was implemented.
In a high trust country it should be associated with at least no decline or —-due to
virtuous cycle— an increase in trust. In nine of ten cases the coefficient of the British
legal origin interaction term has the right sign (negative when interacted with low trust
and positive or non-negative when interacted with high trust). In one case (column (1)
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Panel B), the interaction term for high historical trust is negative but not significant so
this is no real contradiction of the “Second Aghion et al. Hypothesis”. Additionally, in
seven of the ten regressions where the British legal origin dummy is included directly it
is at least marginally significant at 10 % level.
[Table 8 about here]
And the case where it is not significant also the most other variables and interaction
terms are not significant probably because of the low sample size in the sub-sample of
colonies with surely exogenous legal origin according to Klerman et al. (2011). This low
sample size leads to the problem that often there are only few observations for which the
interaction term is one. For this sub-sample of countries we should take the results of
the regression with the alternative trust proxy therefore more serious because the sample
size is somewhat higher.
Another possibility is to look at the interaction terms of French legal origin and
high/low historical trust. Of course, for those we should expect the reverse than for
the British legal origin dummy, i.e. if one introduces civil law in a country with initially
high trust the trust should decline. This is the case in nine of the 16 regressions where
the interaction term for French legal origin countries is included. So, the results are
somewhat unclear concerning that. But the fact that in five of the six cases where the
coefficient is significant it shows the right sign nevertheless indicates that our conjectures
could be true. And again the cases that contradict the “Second Aghion et al. Hypoth-
esis” (like the regression in Panel B column (2)) stem from regressions done with the
Klerman et al. (2011) sub-sample and the original trust proxy. So again, a low sample
size could drive these results. In the one case when the interaction term is significant
and shows the wrong sign, (Panel A column (3)) the result seems to be caused by the
exclusion of Saudi Arabia, Ghana and Morocco. If we exclude all seven countries with
a DFITS value above the threshold and add a dummy for the Sub-Saharan African
countries the interaction term loses its significance again.
In general, the results for this sub-sample at least for the French legal origin interac-
tion term are relatively sensible to the inclusion or exclusion of different controls and
countries. The significant and positive coefficient of the German legal origin dummy
interaction term in regressions (1) and (3) in Panel A should not be taken seriously
because they result from only a few countries for which the interaction term is one in
this regression. Again, the significant negative coefficient in the regression in column (7)
and (8) are much more reliable (because they based on a much larger sample) and in
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line with our expectations and the “Second Aghion et al. Hypothesis” since the German
legal tradition is a modified version of French civil law.
These results are in general not sensitive to the inclusion of the robust covariates of
trust that is the Gini coefficient, ethnic fractionalization, the shares of Muslims and
Catholics and dummies for the post-communistic countries, countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa and former European colonies. They are unaffected when we interact the legal
origin dummies with a dummies indicating above average instead of above median histor-
ical trust (Panel A columns (7) and (8)) and —-to a more limited extent— also when we
change the used trust score sample and/ or the used historical trust proxy. Furthermore,
the main results seem also hold when we exclude the post-communistic transition coun-
tries from the sample instead of simply controlling for them (column (2) and (5) and (6)
in Panel A). In column (5) the interaction term of British legal origin stays negative and
significant as expected after excluding the post-communistic countries, controlling for
the specialities of Sub-Saharan Africa and deleting the countries with the three highest
DFITS values in the regression sample (Saudi Arabia, Ghana and Greece). Of course,
the French legal origin interaction term is insignificant and exhibit the wrong sign but
compared to column (2) where those three countries are not excluded the coefficient is a
little bit less negative. The sign of the French legal origin interaction term becomes the
right (positive) sign when all seven countries with DFITS values above the threshold are
excluded. The fact that almost everything becomes insignificant in this case is maybe a
sign that those seven countries are significant drivers of the estimated effects.
However, it also could be a result of too less variance in the interaction terms caused
by the considerably reduced sample size. In principle, one has to be careful about
simply dropping observations with high leverage or deleting countries that are identified
as outliers. If there are no hints that point to measurement error or if there is no
good story why a particular influential observation or a particular outlier is likely to be
different from all other observations one should not drop the variables. It is therefore
not obvious why we for instance should drop Uruguay or Greece form the data simply
because they are mechanically influential according to their DFITS statistics (in column
(8)). These observations can maybe tell us something important about the relation
between the dependent and independent variables.
Saudi Arabia on the other hand, seems to be an outlier/ influential observation in
almost every regression with the original trust scores sample. It always has far the
highest DFITS statistics. Dropping Saudi Arabia from the sample alone as in column
(8) seems to have considerable consequences since some variables switch from being
insignificant to being significant at 1 % percent level (as the French legal origin dummy
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in column (8)). However, our main conclusion is unaffected by the exclusion of Saudi
Arabia, because the coefficient of the interaction term of French legal origin and low
historical trust becomes even higher after Saudi Arabia is dropped (increases from -0.156
to -0.1792). The same holds true when in column (6) of Panel B Georgia, Mongolia and
South Korea are dropped, or when in column (4) of Panel B Mongolia, South Korea
and Trinidad and Tobago are excluded from the regression sample. It does not hold,
however for the second regression in Panel B, but after deleting Mongolia, Morocco and
South Korea the coefficient of the British legal origin interaction term shows at least the
right instead of the wrong sign. Finally, if the three countries with hugest differences
in the trust scores between both samples (Thailand, Uruguay and Canada) are removed
(Panel B column (8)) the coefficients, like e.g. that of the British legal origin interaction
dummy (16.45 and 18.41) do virtually not change. At most, these changes strengthen
our propositions too. Overall, our investigation suggests that the trust score of Saudi
Arabia is not the correct one but reflecting intentional or unintentional measurement
error. Saudi Arabia therefore should be excluded when one works with trust scores or
at least one should has a careful look on it.
In general, the impression is that the trust scores from the alternative trust score
sample are more reliable and that the results of these regressions are less sensitive to
outliers.37 Removing outliers seems to strengthen the results towards our hypotheses.
Concerning the results of the different sub-samples there is a trade-off. The larger two
sub-samples clearly yield more robust and significant results. But on the other hand,
it is quite likely that they contain some countries for which the legal origin at least to
some extent was not fully exogenous so the results are maybe biased. Nevertheless, the
vast majority of the regression seems to confirm what we had supposed before in the
theoretical section.
As a last thing, we now turn to the results when using three-way interaction terms
(estimations of equation (4))The coefficient ρ4 is shown for the French and British legal
origin countries on which we will focus here in Table 9. In the first estimation we the
Klerman et al. (2011) sub-sample of colonies with exogenous legal origins. For this
sub-sample we get results that clearly confirm the “Second Aghion et al. Hypothesis”.
The coefficient of the British legal origin three-way interaction term is negative and
significant and the coefficient of the French legal origin interaction term is positive and
significant. Even stronger results we get, when focusing on the French legal origin
37 This is e.g. the impression from the inspection of the leverage-versus-squared residual plots of those
regressions. Additionally, the score for Thailand for example (17.7 %) is much more probable than
that of the other sample (54.16 %).
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countries only (column (2)) and when we add ethnic fractionalization and latitude to
the control variables.
[Table 9 about here]
The coefficient of the three way interaction term now has more than doubled and is
significant at 1 % level. So, our propositions seem to hold also for the “problematic”
Klerman et al. lower bound sub-sample —at least in this setting. If we switch former
to all colonies (columns (3) – (5)) and repeat the regression of column (2) but inter-
acting again both the British and the French legal origin dummies the results are again
less clear. The British legal origin interaction term is negative and at least marginally
significant while his French counterpart is insignificant and shows up the wrong sign.
Both coefficients are increased when we additionally control for the time since first hu-
man settlement, the population density in 1500 AD and again ethnic fractionalization.
However, the French legal origin interaction term is still not significant. In the last
regression (column (5) we once more exclude the post-communistic countries from the
sample, control also for the GDP per capita in addition to ethnic fractionalization and
use the alternative sample of trust scores. The result is that now the French legal origin
interaction term when included alone enters significantly and with a positive sign. So,
our findings are robust to quite different set of controls, samples and trust measures
although the strength of the evidence inarguably differs among the various settings.
5. Conclusion
This paper could make at least three contributions to the scientific debate about trust
and institutions:
• It provides evidence that trust and legal origins are connected via their role in
shaping the beliefs of people. It also shows that legal origins only matter in countries
with rule of law, low corruption or a functioning and fully developed democracy.
When institutions cannot work in the way assumed by the legal origins theory or
the institutional environment in a country is very weak and not developed legal
origins seem not to matter. This is contradictory to what for example La Porta et
al. (2008) conclude.
• It discovered some preliminary evidence about the very long-run and stable deter-
minants of trust. These “deep roots” maybe can be traced back thousands of years
ago till the human species began to settle the entire planet. This give rise for var-
ious future research topics and could perhaps be very promising for the future use
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of instrumental variables strategies as well as the discovering of the consequences of
trust and persistent beliefs for long run development.
• It develops Hypotheses about the complex co-evolution and causal relationship be-
tween generalized trust and the institutional continuum in the course of develop-
ment. Here for the first time the author is aware it integrates insights from experi-
mental and neuroeconomic trust research into the canonical framework what seems
to be a fruitful achievement. It then tries to empirically validate some of the impli-
cations of the theoretical model, namely the so called “Aghion et al. Hypotheses”. It
could confirm the “First Aghion et al. Hypothesis” in particular that countries with
high historical trust levels developed other legal institutions than countries with
low historical trust. For the “Second Aghion et al. Hypotheses”, namely that the
introduction of a certain legal system in a country had other consequences for trust
depending on the initial level of trust it founds at least much confirming evidence.
When in future an even larger sample of trust scores will hopefully be available the
results probably will become as clear as for the “First Aghion et al. Hypothesis”.
Additionally, it shows that the extraordinary high trust in the Scandinavian countries
and the very low levels of trust in the Sub-Saharan mixed legal origin countries should
maybe analysed in more detail. The very special institutional environment in the Scan-
dinavian countries with less entry regulation a relatively high acceptance of case law but
much bureaucracy and labour market regulations obviously seems to be very favourable
for the emergence and sustaining of trust. To explore why exactly this is the case is
surely worthwhile. At last, a natural extension of this work would be to study also
the effects of trust on long run economic development via its impact on legal origins or
institutions in general. This could maybe also include a more thorough analysis of the
impact of colonialism on trust and current economic prosperity in the former colonies.
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Table 3: Addressing Endogeneity – LIML IV-Estimations
Dep. Var. Trust
Panel A Second Stage Results
Instrumented Var. Gini Ethnic Fract. Openness GDP Years of Schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
French Legal Origin 1.743 -0.954 0.702 4.880
(2.687) (3.865) (3.130) (3.781)
Mixed Legal Origin -3.202 -14.98** -3.792 -4.978
(4.410) (6.118) (4.003) (4.101)
German Legal Origin 5.633 -2.624 4.164 7.950*
(4.014) (5.982) (4.372) (4.418)
Scand. Legal Origin 8.553 -4.915 14.57* 17.16*
(7.615) (12.25) (8.209) (8.810)
Post-communistic -13.68*** -6.271 -8.076 -14.69***
(4.142) (5.862) (5.265) (5.111)
Sub-Saharan-Africa -6.918** 4.951 1.430 -2.756
(3.242) (7.312) (6.558) (6.402)
Muslims -0.0827* -0.0697 -0.0240 -0.0211
(0.0448) (0.0634) (0.0565) (0.0587)
Catholics -0.108*** -0.111** -0.116*** -0.137***
(0.0347) (0.0516) (0.0386) (0.0398)
Protestants 0.146* 0.193 0.0396 0.0142
(0.0781) (0.122) (0.101) (0.103)
Ethnic Fract. -38.76**
(16.69)
Years of Schooling 2.054
(1.444)
Age (15 - 64) 27.19* 11.10 5.582 6.939
(16.51) (26.53) (21.59) (19.43)
Monarchy 9.315*** 9.784** 8.791*** 10.08***
(2.789) (4.027) (3.074) (3.225)
Openness -0.0335
(0.0263)
Ln(GDP per capita) 5.551*
(3.108)
Gini -0.232
(0.191)
Obs. 81 78 80 94
R2 0.697 0.355 0.637 0.532
Weak-ID Test 12.64 6.592 5.855 9.017
UI-Test 29.56 13.32 17.02 17.29
(p-value) 1.71e-06 0.00128 0.000201 0.000176
Sargan-stat. 4.129 0.216 1.019 1.779
(p-value) 0.127 0.642 0.313 0.182
Endogeneity Test (p-value) 0.402 0.000164 0.321 0.104
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Panel B First Stage Results
Dep. Var Gini Ethnic Fract. Openness Ln(GDP per capita) Years of Schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
French Legal Origin 4.081* -0.0308 -51.70*** -0.255 -1.829***
(2.353) (0.0656) (17.41) (0.236) (0.530)
Mixed Legal Origin 17.00*** -0.162 -13.85 -0.566* -0.202
(3.050) (0.0987) (22.29) (0.302) (0.697)
German Legal Origin -2.179 -0.0380 -50.79** -0.0361 -2.271***
(3.907) (0.0962) (24.38) (0.330) (0.785)
Scand. Legal Origin -7.933 -0.274 -42.42 -1.002 -3.507**
(6.668) (0.189) (47.87) (0.648) (1.391)
Post-communistic 3.340 0.0834 36.45 -1.083*** 1.908**
(4.122) (0.0932) (28.18) (0.382) (0.729)
Sub-Saharan-Africa -5.461* 0.206** -35.42 -1.591*** -2.896***
(3.178) (0.0934) (23.26) (0.315) (0.683)
Muslims -0.0218 0.000586 -0.199 -0.0122*** -0.0248***
(0.0395) (0.00103) (0.288) (0.00390) (0.00777)
Catholics -0.00128 -0.000109 -0.394 -0.00339 0.00767
(0.0320) (0.000889) (0.239) (0.00323) (0.00699)
Protestants 0.0774 0.00241 -0.380 0.00699 0.0302*
(0.0816) (0.00212) (0.577) (0.00782) (0.0156)
Age (15 - 64) 7.990 -0.721* 195.4* 3.301** -0.497
(15.18) (0.418) (108.7) (1.472) (3.384)
Monarchy -4.133 -0.00809 3.190 0.118 0.245
(2.511) (0.0664) (17.88) (0.242) (0.526)
Time since Neo. Rev. -0.00167*** -0.00629 5.53e-06
(0.000507) (0.00392) (5.32e-05)
Latitude(abs) -0.265*** -0.663 0.0236*** 0.0571***
(0.0785) (0.574) (0.00777) (0.0158)
Pop. Dens. 1500 -0.00266 0.0109*
(0.0284) (0.00634)
Pronoun-Drop -0.184***
(0.0672)
TA 1500 -0.178**
(0.0858)
Ln(FR trade-share) 57.82*** 0.291***
(8.082) (0.109)
Obs. 81 78 80 80 94
R2 0.669 0.544 0.526 0.799 0.697
Shea-partial R2 0.3649 0.1708 0.4522 0.2485 0.1840
F-value (excluded IV’s) 12.64 6.59 17.89 7.17 9.02
Notes. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 % and *10
% level. Every regression contains a constant not reported. The underidentification test reports a Anderson canonical LM
statistic (p-value in parenthesis). The null hypothesis is that the reduced form coefficients has rank=K1-1 (underidentified).
The weak identification test reports the value of a Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic. In parenthesis there is the maximum value
of this Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic necessary for not rejecting the null hypothesis that the true significance of hypothesis
tests about the endogenous regressor’s coefficient is smaller than 10 % when the usually stated significance level is 5 %.
The test of overidentifying restrictions reports a Sargan statistics (p-value in parenthesis). The null hypothesis is that the
instruments are valid, that is not correlated with the error term in the second stage and excluded correctly from the reduced
form estimation. The Hausman test tests the endogeneity of the instrumented variables. The null is that the instrumented
variables are exogenous. What is reported is the Chi2 value of the test statistic (p-value in parenthesis). In Panel B under
the F-value of the excluded instruments the p-value of the F-test is in parenthesis.
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Table 4: Detailed Analysis and Subsample Regressions
Dep. Var. Trust
Democracy below Democracy above
median median
(1) (2) (3)
French Legal Origin 9.241** -5.775 6.859**
(3.541) (6.386) (3.148)
Mixed Legal Origin -1.533 -17.20* 4.406
(5.650) (8.408) (5.152)
German Legal Origin 0.209 5.504
(5.080) (5.249)
Scand. Legal Origin 10.54** 11.28**
(5.096) (5.105)
Low Corruption 13.15***
(4.411)
Low Corruption*French LO -10.83**
(5.184)
Low Corruption*Mixed LO -16.60**
(7.025)
Low Corruption*German LO -6.655
(6.287)
Sub-Saharan-Africa -6.981 18.78** -5.423**
(4.082) (7.786) (2.717)
Catholics -0.249*** -0.0934 -0.125***
(0.0650) (0.0713) (0.0317)
Muslims -0.140* 0.123 -0.0895**
(0.0676) (0.218) (0.0368)
Colony -21.35*** 8.610 0.0972
(4.918) (5.640) (3.079)
Post-communistic -8.870***
(2.898)
Monarchy -2.645 7.617** 8.609***
(4.800) (3.428) (2.803)
Gini 0.0986 -0.858*** -0.263*
(0.187) (0.259) (0.134)
Obs. 32 37 105
R2 0.644 0.821 0.669
F-value 5.19 11.9 12
Notes. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1
%, **5 % and *10 % level. Every regression contains a constant not reported.
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Table 7: Historical Trust Levels and the Choice of Legal Systems - IV Probit Estima-
tions
Panel A (Original Trust Proxy)
Not Colonies (Acemoglu et al.) Countries with endogenous
LO (Klerman et al.)
Countries with endogenous
LO and not post-communistic
Dep. Var. British Legal
Origin
French Legal
Origin
British Legal
Origin
French Legal
Origin
British Legal
Origin
French Legal
Origin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trust 0.0445**
(0.024)
-0.0588**
(0.0279)
0.0425***
(0.0145)
-0.0806***
(0.0212)
0.0037***
(0.013)
-0.1072***
(0.03)
Wald Chi2 5.11 4.42 8.56 14.52 8.06 12.77
p> Chi2 0.2376 0.5881 0.367 0.4094 0.4066 0.4984
Obs. 32 32 47 47 38 38
Trust alternative 5.3155**
(2.6096)
-7.1932***
(2.3016)
5.1763**
(2.0966)
-9.466***
(1.8941)
4.4863**
(1.896)
-10.2645**
(2.2505)
Wald Chi2 4.15 9.77 6.1 24.98 5.6 20.8
p>Chi2 0.3612 0.2232 0.4871 0.1098 0.5641 0.0595
Obs. 32 32 47 47 38 38
Panel B (alternative Trust Proxy)
Not Colonies (Acemoglu et al.) Countries with endogenous
LO (Klerman et al.)
Countries with endogenous
LO and not post-communistic
Dep. Var. British Legal
Origin
French Legal
Origin
British Legal
Origin
French Legal
Origin
British Legal
Origin
French Legal
Origin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trust 0.0363
(0.0513)
-0.0712***
(0.0175)
0.0343
(0.0318)
-0.0851***
(0.0146)
0.0358**
(0.018)
-0.0834***
(0.0216)
Wald Chi2 0.5 16.45 1.17 33.8 3.96 14.98
p> Chi2 0.9461 0.0583 0.9898 0.0007 0.7504 0.0582
Obs. 53 53 61 61 43 43
Trust alternative 2.2721
(4.9794)
-6.7967***
(2.1721)
3.105
(4.3578)
-8.8709***
(1.5948)
3.9052
(2.5151)
-8.3748***
(2.085)
Wald Chi2 0.21 9.79 0.51 30.94 2.41 16.13
p> Chi2 0.7539 0.2008 0.8144 0.0012 0.9168 0.0465
Obs. 53 53 61 61 43 43
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Panel C (Proxy of Bjørnskov)
Not Colonies (Acemoglu et al.) Countries with endogenous
LO (Klerman et al.)
Countries with endogenous
LO and not post-communistic
Dep. Var. British Legal
Origin
French Legal
Origin
British Legal
Origin
French Legal
Origin
British Legal
Origin
French Legal
Origin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trust 0.0579***
(0.02)
-0.0297
(0.0238)
0.0481***
(0.018)
-0.0627***
(0.0203) 0.00387***
(0.014)
-0.0719***
(0.0245)
Wald Chi2 8.35 1.56 7.15 9.52 7.62 8.64
p> Chi2 0.1981 0.6266 0.4387 0.5957 0.4835 0.8326
Obs. 57 57 62 62 43 43
Trust alternative 5.9682**
(2.9753)
-3.9083
(2.848)
5.1178*
(2.7215)
-7.5727***
(2.028)
4.0112*
(2.1802)
-7.9271***
(2.3543)
Wald Chi2 4.02 1.88 3.54 13.92 3.39 11.34
p> Chi2 0.4914 0.9795 0.7378 0.1882 0.8605 0.454
Obs. 57 57 62 62 43 43
Panel D (Trust Proxy Colony)
Not Colonies (Acemoglu et al.) Countries with endogenous
LO (Klerman et al.)
Countries with endogenous
LO and not post-communistic
Dep. Var. British Legal
Origin
French Legal
Origin
British Legal
Origin
French Legal
Origin
British Legal
Origin
French Legal
Origin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trust 0.0678***
(0.0106)
-0.0729***
(0.0151)
0.0706***
(0.0112)
-0.0924***
(0.019)
0.061***
(0.0134)
-0.1159***
(0.0317)
Wald Chi2 41.04 23.28 39.71 23.77 20.7 13.36
p> Chi2 0.000 0.0258 0.0001 0.0254 0.0000 0.1604
Obs. 26 26 39 39 35 35
Trust alternative 7.3963***
(1.3038)
-7.1503**
(2.8183)
8.5291***
(1.7051)
-9.6388***
(2.2289)
-9.7241***
(2.6022)
-7.2243***
(1.8536)
Wald Chi2 32.18 6.44 25.02 18.7 13.96 15.19
p> Chi2 0.0000 0.4833 0.0029 0.0838 0.2615 0.0004
Obs. 26 26 39 39 35 35
Notes. Heteroskedasdicity robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 % and *10 % level. The
p> Chi2 denotes the p-value of the Wald test of exogeneity.
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A. Descriptive Statistics
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age (15 - 64) 114 0.64 0.07 0.3 0.77
Bureaucracy Costs (EFI) 104 4.76 1.78 1 9.9
Caselaw 91 1.3 0.82 0 2
Catholics 112 36.39 38.29 0 97.3
Colony 113 0.5 0.5 0 1
Cont. of Corr. (WGI) 114 0.18 1.02 -1 2.48
Credit Market Reg. (EFI) 107 8.56 1.07 5 10
Urbanization 1500 76 7.25 5.245 0 28
Urbanization 2009 113 61.8 21.9 13.14 100
Democ 108 6.45 7.72 -66 10
EFI 1 107 6.46 1.22 4 9.1
EFI 2 107 5.94 1.63 3 9
EFI 5 2009 107 6.83 0.91 4.5 8.9
EFI total 107 6.83 0.75 4.08 9.01
Ethnic Fract. 110 0.4 0.24 0.002 0.93
Ln(FR trade-share) 92 2.8 0.77 0.94 5.639
Legal Formalism 88 3.68 1.08 1 6.01
GDP per capita 113 15124.86 14841.5 142.6 84571.54
Gini 107 39.26 10.11 23 70.7
Jud. Indep.(EFI) 104 4.96 2.38 0 9.2
Juries 113 0.26 0.44 0 1
Labor Regulation 80 0.48 0.19 0.15 0.83
Latitude (Abs) 113 31.1 17.32 0 64
Legal Origin 113 2.19 1.12 1 5
Legal Origin alt. 113 2.36 1.09 1 5
Malaria Risk 94 111 0.2 0.36 0 1
Mintemp 114 9.25 10.43 -16 27
Monarchy 114 0.15 0.36 0 1
Muslims 112 17.52 31.51 0 99.5
Openness 113 90.49 57.89 24 408.51
Post-communistic 114 0.21 0.41 0 1
Pronoun-Drop 114 1.26 0.44 1 2
Protestants 111 12.19 22.02 0 97.8
Entry Regulation 80 2.15 0.54 0.69 3
Rule of Law (WGI) 114 0.18 0.98 -1.835 1.96
Secondary Education 99 25.83 14.99 1 65.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 114 0.18 0.39 0 1
TA 1500 80 0.53 0.33 0 1
Tenure 87 0.45 0.5 0 1
Time since Neo. Rev. 84 4557 2349.076 400 10500
Time Settlement 110 49129.09 45194.52 500 160000
Years of Schooling 99 8.55 2.72 1 13.27
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Table A.3: Descriptive Overview over the Trust Proxies
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Trust 114 25.57 13.4 3.4 64.27
Trust Proxy 80 26.86 10.33 16.19 52.55
Trust Proxy (alternative) 106 25.18 7.51 15.46 45.5
Trust Proxy (Colony) 68 26.9 9.5 13.7 47.11
Trust Proxy (Bjørnskov) 114 25.57 7.98 17.84 46.96
Alternative Trust Sample
Trust alternative 114 0.25 0.13 0.03 0.7
Trust Proxy 80 0.27 0.09 0.18 0.48
Trust Proxy (alternative) 106 0.25 0.07 0.16 0.45
Trust Proxy (Colony) 68 0.27 0.09 0.13 0,45
Trust Proxy (Bjørnskov) 114 0.25 0.07 0.17 0.44
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B. Robustness Checks
This section shows robustness checks of the estimates in Table 1 and the results of a
Jackknife task conducted for the two trust sample and the two main trust proxies.
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Results of the Jackknife Estimations for the Trust Proxies
Table B.2: Jackknife Results for original Trust Proxy and Sample
Minimum
Coefficient
Estimate
Country
removed
Maximum
Coefficient
Country
removed
Monarchy
13.936***
(4.0831)
Saudi
Arabia
17.374***
(4.2293)
Lesotho
TA 1500
7.735**
(3.2053)
Zimbabwe
10.075***
(3.3301)
Canada
Pronoun-Drop
10.649***
(3.5507)
Canada
13.187***
(3.4473)
Zimbabwe
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors (2000 replications) are in parenthesis. Coefficient is statistically
different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 % and *10 % level.
Table B.3: Jackknife Results for original Trust Proxy and alternative Sample
Minimum
Coefficient
Estimate
Country
removed
Maximum
Coefficient
Country
removed
Monarchy
0.106***
(0.0402)
Saudi
Arabia
0.141***
(0.0425)
Thailand
TA 1500
0.064**
(0.0305)
Vietnam
0.082***
(0.0311)
United States
Pronoun-Drop
0.095***
(0.0302)
Finland
0.119***
(0.0316)
Zimbabwe
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors (2000 replications) are in parenthesis. Coefficient is statistically
different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 % and *10 % level.
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Table B.4: Jackknife Results for alternative Trust Proxy and original Sample
Minimum
Coefficient
Estimate
Country
removed
Maximum
Coefficient
Country
removed
Pop. Dens
1500
0.183*
(0.1036) Sweden
0.266**
(0.1053) Rwanda
Latitude (abs) 0.158**(0.0724)
Trinidad
and
Tobago
0.211***
(0.072) Indonesia
Pronoun-Drop 6.987**(3.1479) Australia
9.384***
(2.9994)
Trinidad
and
Tobago
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors (2000 replications) are in parenthesis. Coefficient is statistically
different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 % and *10 % level.
Table B.5: Jackknife Results for alternative Trust Proxy and Sample
Minimum
Coefficient
Estimate
Country
removed
Maximum
Coefficient
Country
removed
Pop. Dens
1500
0.0021**
(0.001) Sweden
0.003***
(0.0011) Rwanda
Latitude (abs) 0.0016**(0.0007)
Trinidad
and
Tobago
0.0021***
(0.0007) Indonesia
Pronoun-Drop 0.0541**(0.0284) Australia
0.0766***
(0.0271)
Trinidad
and
Tobago
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors (2000 replications) are in parenthesis. Coefficient is statistically
different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 % and *10 % level.
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